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ABSTRACT

Using the metaphor of a constitutional conversation to
compare the treatment of a relatively new and unpopular
religion by the legal systems of the United States, Russia, and
Spain, this Article examines the methodology by which laws
affecting religion are made and enforced. It uses as a case study
the interaction of the Jehovah's Witnesses with the legal system
of the United States, comparing it with more recent interactions
in Russia and Spain. The Authors argue that while the
experience in the United States was profoundly influenced by a
common-law methodology, the experience in two civil-law
countries, Russia and Spain, even after the advent of
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constitutional courts, remains somewhat distinct. The more
structuredconversation in Russia and Spain may result in more
predictablerules and efficient enforcement, but the complex and
dynamic U.S. conversation may allow religious minorities
greater voice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the comparative legal treatment of new
religious movements by examining the interaction between the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the legal systems of the United States,
Russia, and Spain. Its focus is not so much on the content of religion
law in each country, but rather its methodology-that is, the sources
and processes by which the law is developed and enforced. An
underlying assumption is that the methods are inseparable from the
law and integral to its significance.
Part II discusses a historical example of reciprocal effects on both
the law and the religious movement, focusing on the United States in
the period around the Second World War, when the Witnesses were a
relatively new and unpopular movement. It uses the metaphor of a
constitutional conversation to capture distinctive aspects of the
interaction. Part III uses the metaphor to describe contemporary
experiences of the Witnesses with the legal systems of Russia and
Spain. Finally, Part IV draws comparisons between these European
and the U.S. methods. This Part assesses each in terms of its ability
to allow development of legal norms while maintaining the stability
required for the rule of law, efficiency and fairness, and its potential
to respond to minority religions.
Including new religious movements in a creative conversation
about religious freedom and governmental regulation by giving them
legal claims for protection has yielded positive results. The Witnesses'
experience in the United States illustrates this in both the law's
stable development and the movement's inclusion in larger society
and legal institutions. It demonstrates that tension between new
religious perspectives and established norms can be negotiated in an
adversarial courtroom setting if the judicial decision is able to affect
the governing legal standards. Russia and Spain, which are unlike
the United States due to their civil-law traditions and histories of
state-sponsored religions, appear to have successfully begun a similar
approach. Their processes may result in greater predictability than
the U.S. approach, but they may have greater difficulty responding to
minority views.

II. THE UNITED STATES
A. Introduction
The experience of the Jehovah's Witnesses in the United States
is a case study of interaction between a relatively new and unpopular
religious movement and a legal system. This interaction had a
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significant effect both on the system and the movement. 1 U.S. law
was reformulated to allow restriction of socially harmful aspects of
the group's behavior while protecting its religious activities from
unnecessarily adverse regulation that would violate fundamental
rights. The movement itself was reformed as well, from one scornful
of civil authority and hostile toward organized religion to one that
styled itself as a religion and obeyed court decrees. In addition, the
movement gradually became less confrontational and provocative and
adopted a more tactful and socially acceptable approach. Both the
salutary and less desirable aspects of this interaction between the
movement and the law are partially attributable to distinctive
aspects of U.S. legal methodology.
The metaphor of a public conversation captures distinctive
aspects of this legal method. 2 The text of the U.S. Constitution set the
parameters and subject matter of the conversation; the legal disputes
generated conversation on varied topics, with specified participants
and rules, in the specific locale of the courtroom. The conversation
would significantly change the meaning of the constitutional text, as
well as the Jehovah's Witnesses' self-understanding and behavior.
The U.S. legal system was accessible to this new religious
movement, and ultimately the Witnesses received discrete attention
through full public hearings. This occurred because the system was
flexible, allowing alternate recourse to another decision-maker if
officials at one level of government were hostile, and providing for
review and reconsideration of decisions and governing rules. The
system was able to protect the Witnesses' beliefs and essential
activities while allowing regulation of behavior necessarily opposed to
legitimate governmental interests. These aspects of the conversation
were partially due to the brief and broadly textured governing
constitutional provisions being particularly suitable to judicial
enforcement; 3 reliance on the gradual, case-by-case method of the

1.
SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES (2000), is a
thorough description of Witness litigation in this period, including the litigants' stories,
the lawyers' strategies and the results and reasoning in the courts. William Shepard
McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Constitutional Law: Jehovah's Witnesses in
the Supreme Court, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 997 (1987), summarizes the effects of their cases
on First Amendment doctrine. This paper covers only litigation on First Amendment
issues during the period of 1937-53, the sixteen years in which the Jehovah's Witness
cases were the most numerous, and addresses only First Amendment issues that
reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
2.
See generally JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 23174 (1984). Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf use the metaphor in LAURENCE TRIBE &
MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 31 (1991).
3.
The governing provisions were those of the U.S. Constitution; international
human rights norms were not at issue. They were not even persuasive during most of
this period, as the United States only signed the International Convention on Human
Rights in 1948. In the United States, international treaties are the supreme law of the
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common law and its avoidance of comprehensive regulation; and the
pervasive effect of national constitutional law on the "ordinary law" of
local administrative regulation.
This also explains the less desirable aspects of the interaction.
The
Witnesses
did
not encounter
an easily
accessible,
understandable, or speedy system of comprehensive religious
regulation. On the contrary, their success followed a slow and
sometimes erratic path of enduring persecution at private and official
hands; extensive periods of uncertainty as to their legal protection;
and expenditure of large amounts of time, money, and energy. 4 The
type of conversation described above meant that regulation was
episodic rather than comprehensive; therefore, rule formulation and
dispute resolution were gradual rather than immediate. Decisionmaking was neither directly democratically accountable nor
transparent. Dispute resolution was inefficient because it was
complicated by alternative fora and ultimately required a lengthy
appellate process. At times, the conversation gave both the Witnesses
and regulatory authorities uncertain and shifting guidance on the
law's requirements.
B. Interaction Between the Jehovah's Witnesses and the U.S. Legal
System
1. The Jehovah's Witnesses in the United States

form

The Jehovah's Witnesses movement is an indigenous American
of Protestant Christianity 5-millennial,
internationalist,

land, equal in status to legislation if not contrary to the Constitution. See Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957).
4.
Negative encounters with the U.S. legal system span from 1918 to at least
1953, or thirty-five years. In 1918, Witness President Joseph Rutherford was indicted
for violating the Espionage Act of 1917 based on his publications against patriotism
and warfare; his 1918 conviction was reversed in 1919. Rutherford v. United States,
258 F. 855, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1919). The first Witness was arrested for house-to-house
preaching in 1928. McAninch, supra note 1, at 1013. The 1953 decision in Poulos v.
New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 39 (1953), was the last of the U.S. Supreme Court cases
concerning local ordinances applied against the Jehovah's Witnesses until the 2002
decision in Watchtower v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), although selective service
cases continued until 1971. See Pryor v. United States, 404 U.S. 1242, 1242-43 (1971)
(continuing bail pending disposition of a Jehovah's Witness' petition for certiorari).
5.

PAUL

K.

CONKIN,

AMERICAN

ORIGINALS:

HOMEMADE

VARIETIES

OF

CHRISTIANITY 145-59 (1997), gives a well-documented, brief and comprehensive
overview of the Jehovah's Witnesses. Its founder, Charles Taze Russell, was raised a
Presbyterian, joined the Congregationalists, and refined his thinking with the Seventh
Day Adventists.

JAMES A.

BECKFORD, THE TRUMPET

OF PROPHECY 1-2

(1975).

Theologically, Russell and present day Witnesses share with more conventional
Christians belief in monotheism and in a god actively involved in human history and
revealed in the Bible, whose son offers hope for humankind to be restored from an
errant state, even though they are antitrinitarian and their doctrine of Christ differs
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apolitical, authoritarian, and fundamentalist-that preaches the
inerrancy of its version of the Bible. 6 Begun as a small group of Bible
students in Pennsylvania in the 1870s, its official website says the
movement now has "6.4 million practicing members organized into
more than 95,000 congregations in some 230 lands. '7 Its members
are ethnically or racially indistinct and represent a wide range of
social classes, although generally they are not among the least or
most privileged.8 Nor have the Witnesses appeared to be especially
inclined toward economic or political activism. 9 Nevertheless, their
adherence to certain beliefs has caused friction with civil authorities
in the United States and elsewhere.
One such belief is neutrality toward, or non-involvement in,
government. Witnesses claim that "accelerating deterioration of
human institutions and conditions of life" is proof that Christ has
"already begun to prepare over the . . . imminent millennial paradise
on earth."'10 Thus, Witnesses do not trust institutions such as
governments. In fact, from 1929 until 1962, their doctrine required

from that taught by most other Christians. See id. at 3-6, 106-07. Russell opposed
modernist thought, to which Calvinistic Protestantism in the United States largely
adapted with a democratic social ideology that emphasized the individual, appreciation
of the scientific method, and concern for unsatisfactory social conditions. Id. at 3. The
Witness faith insists on absolute and unitary truth, illustrated and played out in
history and apparent upon rational, logical reflection, in urgent need of dissemination,
and supervised and detailed in doctrine by the hierarchy of the organization, which is
beyond criticism. See id. at 103-21.
Like other millennialists, Witnesses believe literally in Christian Biblical
6.
references to a thousand years during which holiness will prevail and Christ will reign
on earth, but they read the Bible distinctively, with a specific and distinct chronology.
They believe Christ already returned invisibly and began preparation. See BECKFORD,
supra note 5, at 5. Present-day Witnesses, therefore, have the opportunity to display
faith in Christ's redemptive power, survive the Battle of Armageddon for an imminent
millennium in which they may live on earth in a paradise for a thousand years. Id. at
108. Conviction that God is drawing to a close the time in which one can heed the
Witnesses' message adds urgency and mandates international witnessing to God's
existence, loving nature, and plans for the world. Id. at 109. It also reduces the need to
alleviate present social and economic conditions, makes governments largely irrelevant
and the Witnesses apolitical, and encourages reliance on an authoritarian and elitist
organization to accomplish the task. Id. at 103-21; see McAninch, supra note 1, at 105459.
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania, Membership and
7.
Publishing Statistics (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.jw-media.org/people/
statistics.htm. Disappointment in prophecy that Armageddon would begin in 1975 and
a tightening of centralized control in 1977 appears to have led to only modest growth in
the U.S. since 1975, according to a non-Witness academic source, although "[c]onverts,
particularly in the third world, more than made up for defections." CONKIN, supra note
5, at 157.
8.
BECKFORD, supra note 5, at 134, 158 (Sociological study of Witnesses in
Great Britain refutes stereotypical notions that Witnesses display low or inconsistent
social class profiles).
Id. at 134-59, 208-09.
9.
10.
Id. at 111; McAninch, supra note 1, at 1059.
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Witnesses to obey the Watch Tower Society's leading officials, but not
necessarily secular or governmental authorities." Today, Witnesses
12
do not vote, serve on juries, or join the armed forces.
Another belief is their refusal to engage in patriotic exercises
that involve "graven images," which appears to come from an
interpretation of Exodus 20:3-5 in the Hebrew Scriptures
incorporated into the Christian Bible.' 3 In 1935, Witness President
Joseph Rutherford publicly praised Witnesses in Nazi Germany who
resisted offering the Hitler salute, a military style salute with the
hand forward at eye level. 14 He noted its similarity to the flag salute
many children in the United States performed as part of opening
school exercises, and he claimed it was unfaithful "to ascribe
salvation by saluting an earthly emblem."'1 5 Witnesses today, like
those school children who generated litigation more than sixty years
ago, refuse to salute the flag.
Yet another friction-producing belief is the commission to
'' 6
witness "to God's existence, loving nature and plans for the world. i
Although this commission is shared by most Christians, when
combined with the Witnesses' millennial belief, it can produce
offensive behavior. For example, Witness doctrine teaches that only a
limited number of preordained or elect people will serve with Christ
in heaven. But others-the great company (including most
Witnesses)--can survive the Battle of Armageddon and live on earth
in bliss for a thousand years, if they learn the correct biblical
teachings and choose God's offer of redemption. 17 Only those thus
rescued from corrupt and false teaching (i.e., the teaching of all other

11.
"Let every soul be subject unto the higher power. For there is no power but
of God; the powers that be are ordained of God." Romans 13:1, 2. Although Russell
interpreted "higher powers" to mean secular or governmental authorities, his
successor, Rutherford, interpreted this as a command to obey the Witness leadership.
BECKFORD, supra note 5, at 114. The 1962 interpretation reverted to the earlier
teaching. Id. James Beckford speculates that this may reflect governmental
persecution in Rutherford's day and during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, less so in the
1960s. Id.
12.
McAninch, supra note 1, at 1058-59.
13.

Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto
thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven
above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the
earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I
the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers
upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that
hate me.

Exodus 20:3-5.
14.

PETERS, supra note 1, at 24-25.

15.
Id. at 25 (quoting Lillian Gobitis, one of the children represented by their
parents as plaintiffs in Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
16.

BECKFORD, supra note 5, at 109.

17.

See supra note 6.
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religions, particularly the Roman Catholic Church) will have this
opportunity; others may be
destroyed in Armageddon or may be
18
denied entry into paradise.
In the 1920s, Rutherford mandated rescue of the ignorant by
proselytizing door-to-door and in public parks and street corners. He
organized and systematized evangelism to provide Witnesses with
"tracts, magazines, booklets, Bibles, records and record players,
bookmarks, and 'sound cars,' capable of blaring prerecorded
messages."'19 As opposed to the traditional Christian practice of
Sunday morning worship services, some have characterized this mode
20
of evangelism as the highest form of Witness worship.
Because it is considered a condition of survival through
Armageddon, 21 evangelism has had a sense of urgency that made it
aggressive and even, at times, obnoxious. The Witnesses were
encouraged to "rescue" or proselytize when churches were in worship
on Sunday mornings. 22 Fervent and organized, they often
overwhelmed small towns with groups of as many as 1,000 zealous
evangelists at a time. 23 Although they asked for a donation to pay for
printing their tracts, they would leave them for free. Convinced that
the falsity of other religions' teachings needed to be demonstrated,
they denigrated other faiths and clergy in general, causing hostile
24
reactions and even brawls.

18.
BECKFORD, supra note 5, at 110; PETERS, supra note 1, at 31-32. The
Witnesses did not consider themselves a conventional church or religion; they had no
creed, and all members were ministers. See BECKFORD, supra note 5, at 104, 108;
CONKIN, supra note 5, at 153.
19.
PETERS, supra note 1, at 32. Communication was crucial before
Rutherford's urging. Active Jehovah's Witnesses are called "publishers." The stated
purpose of the organization upon incorporation was "the dissemination of Bible truths
in various languages by means of the publication of tracts, pamphlets, papers and
other religious documents, and by the use of all other lawful means." McAninch, supra
note 1, at 1005 (quoting art. II of the Charter of Zion's Watch Tower Tract Society in
WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES IN
THE DIVINE PURPOSE 27 (1959)).
20.
PETERS, supra note 1, at 32; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 117 (1943) (holding license fee for distribution of literature and solicitation
burdened religious exercise).
21.
BECKFORD, supra note 5, at 203.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 33-34; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301-03 (1940).
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2. Effect on Constitutional Law
With remarkable persistence over a thirty-five year period, 25 the
Jehovah's Witnesses vigorously protected themselves from the actions
and regulations of local governments. The official hostility stemmed
from public antipathy because the Witnesses abstained from patriotic
exercises and civic duties in wartime, spoke disrespectfully of political
and religious leaders, and insulted the religions of others in the
course of incessant proselytizing. 2 6 Represented by private lawyers of
their own religious persuasion, and aided by lawyers representing
civic voluntary associations, such as the American Civil Liberties
Union and the American Bar Association Committee on Civil
Rights, 27 the Witnesses secured protection through the federal and
state courts. A by-product of their struggle was a significant number
of remarkably influential U.S. Supreme Court decisions that
expanded the law of the First Amendment on freedom of speech,
28
press, and religion.

25.
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Jehovah's Witnesses appealed more than two
dozen times to the U.S. Supreme Court, resulting in twenty-three Supreme Court
opinions between 1938 and 1946. PETERS, supra note 1, at 185. When the U.S.
Supreme Court dismissed the Witnesses first appeal in 1937, Coleman v. City of
Griffith, 302 U.S. 636 (1937), the movement had been legally organized for only fiftythree years, and its most aggressive and provocative proselytizing activities had begun
only fifteen years earlier. McAninch, supra note 1, at 1004. The Witnesses incorporated
in the United States as the "Zion's Watch Tower Tract Society" in 1884. Id. The
vigilante attacks and hostile governmental treatment that prompted their judicial
appeals followed aggressive door-to-door and street corner proselytizing begun in the
early 1920s. PETERS, supra note 1, at 30-32.
26.
Episodes of hostile and often violent public reaction are well-documented
throughout PETERS, supra note 1. The Jehovah's Witnesses believed that "all other
religion is 'a snare and a racket"; other clergy are tools of Satan, as are governments
and politicians; "and everyone (except the Witnesses) is doomed to eternal
nothingness." McAninch, supra note 1, at 1002. The conviction that all members are
ministers and witnessing to their creed their worship, the felt urgency of the need to
convert others, and their particularly venomous attacks on the Roman Catholic Church
combined to make their proselytizing particularly incessant, aggressive, and
confrontational. See id.
27.
PETERS, supra note 1, at 48-49, 99-104, 249.
28.
U.S. Supreme Court decisions made the Free Exercise Clause protect not
only against actions of the national government, but also the state governments.
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296, expanded on the prohibition against prior restraints on
speech while expanding the right to speak in public places and developing the "strict
scrutiny" standard still used today for judicial review of governmental action
regulating the content of protected speech or targeting religion (see, e.g., Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)); it also articulated the freedom to refrain from
speaking. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). While the
reasons that the Supreme Court decided these particular cases the way it did are
complex and certainly not confined to the actions and arguments of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, see Neil M. Richards, The "Good War," The Jehovah's Witnesses, and The
First Amendment, 87 VA. L. REV. 781 (2001), nevertheless, it is clear that their cases
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a. Access to and Use of Public Property for Expressive Activities
Brawls led to arrests for disorderly conduct, trespassing, assault
and battery, 29 or under ordinances seldom used, like using offensive
words in public and riotous conspiracy.30 Citizen complaints led to the
passage of local ordinances that prohibited or required permission for
leafleting, soliciting, or holding meetings in public places,3 1 and
others that required payment of a fee. 32 Witness reservations about
civil authority combined with their mandate to evangelize in public
(the last belief summarized above) meant Witnesses resisted such
permit and fee requirements and continued to be arrested. The
resulting litigation gave rise to landmark Supreme Court decisions
outlining the law of access and use of public property for expressive
33
activities.
The change began with the Court's abandonment of the commonlaw doctrine that use of public streets and parks could be completely
controlled by governmental owners. Two cases brought by Jehovah's
Witnesses foreshadowed this change: the Court held that permit
ordinances without clear standards to guide officials violated the
First Amendment rights of free speech, press, and exercise of religion
when applied to Witnesses going door-to-door on public streets and
distributing literature.3 4 From these early Witness cases to the most
recent in 2002, a complex body of law on permissible permit

were the "primary vehicle by which the Court ... sketched the basic outlines of what
became its modern rights jurisprudence." Id. at 800.
See, e.g., Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301-03.
29.
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569-70 (1942).
30.
31.
See, e.g., Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 269-70; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 141-42 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 418-20 (1943); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 415 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 148 (1939); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1938).
See, e.g., Follet v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 574 (1944); Murdock v.
32.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 585-86 (1942),
vacated by 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
At times Witnesses would also seek injunctive relief against enforcement of
33.
ordinances. See, e.g., Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 1947) (directing
injunction to restrain from enforcing municipal resolutions and ordinances requiring
permits for park use and barring those without rightful business to enter town).
34.
The doctrine of public ownership and control, see Davis v. Massachusetts,
167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897), was not followed in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), which was noted the same year in the Witness case
of Schneider, 308 U.S. 147; both cases followed the Witness case of Lovell, 303 U.S.
444. The permit systems were unconstitutional because they (1) regulated public
streets, which are "natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and
opinion"; (2) were not confined to commercial canvassing; (3) did not specify the reasons
for which permits could be denied as legitimate governmental concerns, such as
prevention of fraud or limiting hours for privacy of homeowners; and (4) could not be
justified to prevent possible litter, an insufficiently significant reason to limit exercise
of First Amendment freedoms. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163-65.
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regulation evolved, including definition of which non-content-related
35
restrictions could be placed on speech in public places.
The Court ruled in these Witness opinions that the standardless
permit requirements constituted invalid prior restraints upon speech
and exercise of religion. This doctrine had particular force when the
restraint applied to speech on public property, such as public streets.
The idea that expressive activities had a type of easement on public
property became a linchpin of what is now called the "public forum
doctrine." As a starting point of speech analysis, the doctrine states
that different rules-rules most protective of speech and most
restrictive of government regulation-apply when the location in
question is traditionally used or governmentally designated for
36
assembly, debate, or communication of ideas among citizens.
In a public forum, religiously and politically expressive activity
cannot be regulated based upon its subject matter or the viewpoint
expressed-the courts review such regulation with the utmost
scrutiny, demanding that the regulation serve a compelling
governmental purpose and be drafted in the manner least restrictive
of expression.3 7 Such expression cannot be regulated by a
bureaucratic process so lax and imprecise that it is easily
manipulated to suppress the expression of a particular viewpoint or
subject matter. 38 On the other hand, regulation of the time, place, or
manner of expression is permissible in a public forum, but only if it is
reasonable: it must be specifically drafted to serve an important
governmental interest (although not in the least restrictive manner)
39
and leave open adequate alternative places for communication.
Finally, a licensing scheme must meet several strict criteria; a
40
scheme that does not meet such standards may be ignored.

35.
The most recent formulation of this law in a Witness case appears in
Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
36.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
The Witness cases of Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1955), and Lovell, 303 U.S. 444,
are cited as sources for the doctrine in Neimotko, 340 U.S. at 271, another Witness
case.

37.
See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992). By contrast, other properties can be closed to expressive activity or restricted
under more lenient criteria. Id. at 679. The regulation need only be reasonable and
viewpoint neutral. Id. at 679.
38.
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164.
39.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
40.
Permit systems are considered to be a form of prior restraint. To pass
constitutional scrutiny, they must have (1) clear substantive standards limiting the
administrator's discretion; (2) tightly confined, valid grounds for disallowing the permit
under specified circumstances; and (3) a virtually costless opportunity for a party
denied a permit to secure immediate review of any adverse administrative decision in a
(4) regular adversary proceeding before a neutral party, in which proceeding (5) the
burden rests with the state to sustain the denial of the permit, rather than with the
private party to show why it should not be sustained. See Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 269-73;
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE AMERICAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
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All these principles are now foundational. The premise of judicial
enforcement of First Amendment guarantees is that regulation of the
content or viewpoint of expressive activity in public places is
presumptively unconstitutional. Review requires exacting judicial
attention to the purpose that the regulation serves and whether it is
necessary to achieve that purpose. That permits are suspect as prior
restraints on speech and must be tailored to meet specific criteria
underlies local regulation of public demonstrations today. Two
principles are also foundational: (1) that regulation for purposes not
related to content in a public forum must also be justified and (2) that
regulation in nonpublic fora is allowed when reasonable and
viewpoint neutral. All these First Amendment principles are rooted in
41
cases brought by the Jehovah's Witnesses.
b. Freedom From Coerced Speech and of Religious Exercise
The combination of Witness indifference to civil authority and
refusal to engage in patriotic exercises that involve "graven images"
caused litigation resulting in another key First Amendment principle,
known today as freedom from coerced speech. Assuming local school
authorities had the power to require children to recite the pledge of
allegiance and salute the national flag or be expelled, Justice
Frankfurter wrote for the Supreme Court in the 1940 Minersville
School District v. Gobitis opinion that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment did not exempt Jehovah's Witness children from
that requirement. 42 Three years later the Court reversed itself with
Justice Frankfurter dissenting. In West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, the Court ruled that the Free Speech Clause
meant the local school board did not have the authority to expel
Jehovah's Witness schoolchildren who refused to salute the flag and
43
recite the pledge.

CENTURY 377-78 n.61 (3d ed. 2002). When applicable to religious and political speech,
they may not require and make public personal identification. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at
166-67. A permit system not complying with these standards need not be complied with
and can be attacked as void on its face. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452.
41.
Time, place, and manner considerations can be traced to Lovell, 303 U.S. at
451, and Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161-62, and are articulated again in Niemotko, 340
U.S. at 271-72, another Witness case. Heightened judicial attention to regulation of
speech in a public place goes back at least to Schneider, 308 U.S. 147, and is confirmed
in modern public fora analysis, like that in Int7 Socy, 505 U.S. at 679-85. While Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, relaxed the least intrusive alternative part of the time,
place, and manner analysis, and the public fora doctrine has become a historically set
category that can prevent effective constitutional protection for expressive activity on
government property, see Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine
and the Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335 (1986), these principles are still
evident as foundational principles of First Amendment law.
42.
310 U.S. 586, 599-600 (1940).
43.
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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c. Judicial Power
All the decisions discussed above were part of a period in which
the Supreme Court expanded the reach of federal constitutional law
and increased the intensity with which it reviewed the actions of
other branches of government. Each decision relied upon the First
Amendment to invalidate actions not of the federal government, but
of state and local governments, and did so under the incorporation
doctrine. During this period the Court established that the "liberty"
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects incorporates most of the
liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, making federal constitutional
law reach the actions of state and local officials. Another Witness
case, Cantwell v. Connecticut, was a component of this doctrinal
development. In Cantwell the Court ruled for the first time that44the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Free Exercise Clause. It
prevented the state of Connecticut from convicting Jehovah's
Witnesses for proselytizing and soliciting without approval.
Moreover, the Court overturned the conviction of a Witness for the
common-law crime of inciting a breach of the peace by disturbing
listeners with a recording of an attack on all organized religions
45
(particularly the Roman Catholic Church) as instruments of Satan.
All the cases above figured prominently in a decisive period in
the development of constitutional law during the late 1930s to the
1960s in which the Court restricted its deferential constitutional
review of the actions of the other branches to economic regulation. It
began actively taking the role of a vigilant protector against
governmental action affecting personal liberties-those in the Bill of
Rights and in the post-Civil War Amendments. By putting the burden
on the government to defend regulation of speech and religion, 46 the
Court set a high standard for government regulators, a standard that
the Court proved willing to enforce. Thus, the Witness cases not only
formulated key doctrines of the law of expressive freedom, but were
also part of a momentous shift in the judiciary's approach, which
extended federal constitutional law to the states and expanded
federal judicial power. In this sense, the cases played a part in laying
the groundwork for the later expansion of civil liberties by the Court
in the 1960s through the 1980s.

44.
45.
46.
444.

310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
Id. at 307-11.
See, e.g., Niemotko, 340 U.S. 268; Schneider, 308 U.S. 147; Lovell, 303 U.S.
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3. Effect on the Jehovah's Witnesses
Another effect of the interaction between the Witnesses and the
U.S. legal system was on the behavior and ideology of the religious
movement. From the time of their first arrests in the late 1920s, to
their legal efforts in the 1960s, to their efforts to prevent
nonconsensual blood transfusions and to oppose military conscription
in the 1970s, the Witnesses changed tactics and doctrine. They
steadily became less hostile and confrontational. The leadership
deliberately used the Witnesses' hierarchy and teaching functions "to
infuse the entire ... organization with legal considerations. '47 After
the Court opinions were published in the late 1930s and early 1940s,
the Witnesses operated relatively freely for a time; during the 1960s
and 1970s, their conduct became increasingly less provocative toward
mainstream religions and the general Dublic. 48 Religious doctrine
changed to encourage greater obedience to civil authorities, and the
Witnesses characterized their movement as a religion similar to more
established ones, rather than as the opponent of any and all
organized religion. 49 Today their meeting halls dot city and village
streets, and although they proselytize door-to-door frequently and do
not always receive a warm welcome, they seldom engender violent
reaction or cause a public disturbance. 50
Litigation in the 1930s to the 1950s affected the Witnesses so
extensively that one sociological study has described it as a strategy
of "disciplined litigation" that effected a "deformation" of the original
norms and organization. 51 This deformation was due to a dramatic
and pervasive combination of external pressures (from government,
more established religions, and the public) and internal pressures
(such as ideology and organization). 52 It has not been empirically
established that the Witnesses' experience with the U.S. legal system
was a cause of their transformation; nevertheless, the change that

Pauline C6t6 & James T. Richardson, Disciplined Litigation, Vigilant
47.
Litigation, and Deformation: Dramatic OrganizationChange in Jehovah's Witnesses, 40
J. FOR SCI. STUD. RELIGION 11, 14 (2001). The period of intense litigation corresponded
with the presidency of Joseph Rutherford, a lawyer who used the title of judge. He
centralized control over individual members and organized the strategy of
confrontation and litigation. CONKIN, supranote 5, at 151-54.
See BARBARA GRIZZUTI HARRISON, VISIONS OF GLORY 177 (1978); PETERS,
48.
supra note 1,at 291-95; McAninch, supra note 1,at 1059.
49.
McAninch, supra note 1, at 1058-59; see also BECKFORD, supra note 5, at
210.
Nevertheless, they are not as close to the mainstream of U.S. Protestant
50.
Christianity as other wings of apocalyptic and Adventist Christianity, the Mormons,
and the Seventh Day Adventists, seeming more sectarian and visible. See CONKIN,
supra note 5, at 157.
See C6t6 & Richardson, supra note 47.
51.
52.
See C6t6 & Richardson, supranote 47, at 11.
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followed the period in which the litigation commenced has been well
documented. The legal protection gave the Witnesses freedom not
only to exercise their religion but also to develop in ways not
motivated by hostility to government. Indeed, certain aspects of the
legal experience and the legal positions adopted suggest that the law
may have encouraged behavior likely to increase their chances of
success in court.
Successful litigation required and reinforced a tightly organized,
hierarchical organization to hire and direct attorneys, select cases,
decide ultimate questions of strategy, and publish results. 53 The
organizational
structure
Witnesses'
hierarchical, centralized
continues today.5 4 Litigation also yielded benefits for the movement:
certain individuals were edified, and solidarity was built by providing
legal, moral, and material assistance to litigants. 55 Periodicals
reported courtroom "witnessing" to the superiority of Witness beliefs.
Court decisions did not condone the more extreme Witness
behavior. Ruling against the Witnesses in 1942, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that personally directed, provocative epithets were not
protected speech. 56 Even in decisions reversing Witness convictions,
the Court emphasized that the Witness had not been personally
offensive or argumentative and that the locality had the power5 to
7
regulate for the public peace, good order, convenience, and comfort.
Also in 1942, under the leadership of a new president, Witness
tracts became less hyperbolic and fiery, and more moderate in their
scorn for other religions. 58 Witnesses abandoned many of their
aggressive and confrontational techniques, such as transporting
groups of Witnesses to a single town in proselytizing squads; and
instead, they emphasized educating humankind about the divine
truth by providing an example of the benefits of Witness lifestyle
rather than by denunciation. 59
Doctrine shifted as well. In 1962, the Watch Tower Society
returned to its original biblical understanding that governments were
established by God and should be accepted, rejecting the 1929
Rutherford teaching that only the Society's officials, and not the

53.
Id. See generally PETERS, supra note 1.
C6t6 & Richardson, supra note 47, at 16-18. From its origins, the movement
54.
was partly a "rational business enterprise for the production and dissemination of
religious literature"; a sociologist has concluded that this "instrumental and pragmatic"
character has shaped its organization, and that its centralized governance under an
elite leadership invulnerable to most forms of internal and external attack or social
pressure largely explains its conversion successes. BECKFORD, supranote 5, at 210.
55.
BECKFORD, supra note 5, at 56-61.
56.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
57.
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
58.
CONKIN, supra note 5, at 156.
59.
BECKFORD, supra note 5, at 46-48.
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government, should be obeyed. 60 While not always obeying local draft
board orders to report, Witnesses obeyed the courts in conscription
cases. And they actively sought ministerial exemptions, which
marked a change from their former hostility toward organized
religion and clergy. They began building Kingdom Halls, which
housed meetings that focused on studying Witness literature and
came to resemble the Sunday worship of the Christian denominations
61
they had earlier denounced.
The U.S. legal system was accessible to this new and unpopular
religious movement. Ultimately, the Witnesses received discrete
attention at the highest levels through full judicial hearings, in a
system flexible enough to allow alternative recourse when officials at
one level of government were hostile. It allowed review and
reconsideration not only of decisions, but also of governing rules. The
system proved able to protect the Witnesses' essential activities,
while allowing regulation of their behavior when it opposed
legitimate and significant governmental interests. The interaction
may have even allowed the movement to institutionalize into a
religion more amenable to civil authority and encouraged it to adopt
more socially and legally acceptable methods. Progress was slow and,
at times, erratic; this religious minority endured persecution at
private and official hands, extensive periods of uncertainty about
their legal protection, and expenditure of large amounts of time,
62
money, and energy.
C. The Interaction as a Distinctively American Constitutional
Conversation
The interaction between the Jehovah's Witnesses and the legal
system occurred largely through the method of U.S. constitutional
law. 63 The oldest written constitution currently in use, the U.S.
Constitution is also the briefest. 64 Thinking of the Constitution as
initiating a conversation about its own ongoing significance in the
varied situations it addresses helps to explain its continued
effectiveness over so long a period in such a legally active nation as
65
the United States.
According to this metaphor, the constitutional text sets the terms
of the conversation; it "creates a set of speakers, defines the occasions

BECKFORD, supra note 5, at 114; McAninch, supra note 1, at 1059 n.421.
60.
61.
McAninch, supra note 1, at 1059.
62.
See supra note 4.
The Witnesses also litigated statutory issues, such as their members' status
63.
under the Selective Service Act (military conscription). See, e.g., Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114, 115-16 (1946).
64.
Effective in 1788, it contains 4,400 words.
65.
See generally WHITE, supra note 2, at 231-74; TRIBE, supra note 2, at 31.
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for and topics of their speech, and is itself a text that may be referred
to as authoritative." 66 Among the speakers, for instance, the text
identifies the Congress, the states, the Executive, the courts, and
those who litigate constitutional claims, such as those who claim
constitutional protection for their exercise of religion. 67 Fora and
occasions for speech include legislative debates, presidential State of
the Union addresses, and cases and controversies in the courtsabove all, in the U.S. Supreme Court. The conversation confirms,
maintains, and renews the political order that the Constitution was
instrumental in creating. Through the conversation, the Constitution
itself is confirmed, maintained, and renewed. Not only is it able to
regulate as positive law, but also to change its meaning by interacting
with speakers and audiences on several and varied occasions.
1. An Authoritative Text Sets Parameters
The brief text of the First Amendment sets the parameters of the
conversation and is its basic subject matter. Composed of forty-five
words in one sentence, it states that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." 68 The Jehovah's Witnesses'
World War II conversation about these words built upon
conversations dating back more than a hundred years, at least to the
Amendment's effective date, 1791.
Essentially a series of injunctions against the national
government, the Amendment is negative and absolute. Indeed, the
two clauses about religion have operated together to create, in effect,
a presumption against comprehensive regulation of religion as such.
This is apparent from the absence of sections dealing with religion in
the federal and state codes. There is little room for legislative
discrimination among religions because the Establishment Clause
implies equality of treatment among religions. 69 Direct regulation of
religious activity appears to be precluded by institutional autonomy
inferred from the Free Exercise Clause 70 and non-entanglement

WHITE, supra note 2, at 245.
66.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
67.
prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68.
Id.
69.
At the minimum, all the Justices appear to agree that the Establishment
Clause forbids preferential support for one religious denomination. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990), states that
70.
government may not "lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over
religious authority and dogma" and cites decisions that establish institutional
autonomy in many aspects of religious life. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
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inferred from the Establishment Clause.7 1 Legislation does regulate
religion, but it generally does so indirectly, in that legislation is
neutral in regard to religion on its face, but applies to religious
individuals and organizations among others. An example is taxation
treatment of charitable or nonprofit organizations, which may include
religious groups among others.
Historical context reinforced the presumption against direct
regulation of religion. Historical immigration by religious groups to
the country to avoid prosecution by authorities in England and
continental Europe created a paradigm in which regulation of religion
became associated with repressive regulation and was therefore
suspect.
The presumption against national regulation is particularly
strong. The First Amendment's negative injunction explicitly applies
to Congress. And the Constitution, ratified by state governments that
preexisted the national government, gave only limited powers to the
national government and is otherwise silent about the power to
regulate religion. The Tenth Amendment echoes the implications of
this constitutional silence: states, not the national government, have
plenary legislative powers. Only between the 1920s and 1940s, when
the Court gradually incorporated most of the provisions of the first
ten Amendments into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, did the First Amendment apply to the states. The
limited nature of the federal government and traditional assumptions
about state and national governmental powers meant that local
legislation affected religion more often than national legislation did.
Therefore, the Court generally addressed the religion clauses in the
context of disputes over state and local action: funding of religious
schools, child-raising practices, door-to-door distribution of literature
and solicitation, school exercises, and use of local parks.
Thus, the conversation about religious freedom concerned brief,
negative injunctions and examination of discrete, religiously related
but facially neutral actions of local government. As a result, the
conversation addressed large questions of appropriate relations
between government and religion without a great deal of guidance
from enacted texts.

Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-725 (1976); Presbyterian Church in United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95-119 (1952).
71.
See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (using
significant risk of entanglement between church and state in statutory construction
favoring religious autonomy from NLRB oversight); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-15 (1971).
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2. Participants Initiate, Shape, and Publicize the Conversation
The Jehovah's Witnesses relied upon the Free Exercise Clause,
an authoritative text that explicitly identifies the religiously
observant as participants in the conversation. State or local
governments usually opposed them. As plaintiffs or as defendants,
the Witnesses were active participants, exploiting their ability to
choose their forum, take appeals, and raise the topics they wanted
while spreading their religious message. Their
addressed
conversation was not a private one; it included nonparties and an
attentive public audience, and it affected the behavior of others.
Indeed, the Court was not only their audience, but the Justices also
engaged in conversation with one another prompted by the
Witnesses.
The Free Exercise Clause entitled the Witnesses to a role in the
constitutional conversation by giving them a claim. At the time of
their greatest litigation effort, that claim was to a constitutional
exemption from generally applicable governmental regulation. They
based their claims on the grounds that the regulation prohibited or
substantially burdened their religious exercise as well as violated free
72
speech guarantees.
The Witnesses organized themselves in a litigation effort,
employed national counsel (also Witnesses) who employed local
counsel as needed, and trained members to present a free exercise
defense to local authorities if arrested. 73 To enable Witness counsel to
raise the free exercise defense, members who became plaintiffs or
defendants had to submit to arrest and detention and refuse to plead
guilty, pay the fine, or serve the sentence. Counsel pursued claims in
federal and state courts, but because of the cooperation of local
officials and influential citizens in the persecution of the Witnesses,
they often resorted to federal courts for protection. 74 In Supreme

72.
In Smith, 494 U.S. 872, the Supreme Court in effect overruled a line of
precedents in the area, by multiple distinguishing techniques, and held that
exemptions were unavailable and religious claimants were not entitled to the highest
degree of judicial scrutiny of otherwise neutral and uniform laws disproportionately
burdening them, although they are entitled to minimal equal treatment review and
could gain close judicial scrutiny of regulation that targeted them unjustifiably. See
also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993).
McAninch, supra note 1, at 1013 n.110 (citing WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND
73.
TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES IN THE DIVINE PURPOSE 132

(1959)); see also C6t6 & Richardson, supra note 47, at 14.15.
See, e.g., Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 883 (8th Cir. 1947) (Successful
74.
Witness recourse to federal court for injunctive relief to prevent Mayor and town
officials, with cooperation of state Attorney General and Director of Pubic Safety, from
barring Witnesses from entering the town). The Department of Justice, despite public
comments of the Solicitor General condemning attacks on the Witnesses, was reluctant
to sue on their behalf. PETERS, supra note 1, at 145-46.
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Court oral argument, the Witnesses' counsel articulated the basic
teachings of the faith, even sermonizing, convinced that they followed
an example in the Bible of testifying to kings and rulers. 75 They
consistently characterized their proselytizing as worship and
challenged their regulation and arrest as violations of their religious
free exercise rights. They were able to make free exercise of religion
76
a topic of conversation at the highest court in the nation.
The Witnesses example illustrates the active role of attorneys in
shaping U.S. law and the law's responsiveness to individuals and
minority groups through the court system. By selecting claims under
federal or state law, whether constitutional or statutory, attorneys
and litigants can select the area of law and the court in which to
pursue their claim. By selecting cases to litigate, discovering
evidence, and admitting or opposing it, litigants can influence trial
court holdings. And as rules of procedure confine appellate courts to
the record and issues addressed at trial, attorneys' strategies shape
appellate decisions as well. When the conversation takes place in the
courts, the legal system gives those participants very active,
determinative roles in delineating the fora, precise subtopics, and the
parameters of the conversation. The courts must listen to the parties,

75.
PETERS, supra note 1, at 127-30 (quoting Chief Counsel Hayden Covington).
76.
Ultimately, however, the story is one of failure to develop free exercise
doctrine as an independent guarantee of the rights and status of religion. The Court
initially held that proselytizing cases raised free exercise claims as well as speech and
press claims, see, e.g., Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Follet v. McCormick, 321
U.S. 573 (1944); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418
(1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584
(1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938). Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), and Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944), considered and rejected free exercise claims. The holding in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940), on coerced patriotic
exercises, was a free exercise holding. See supra note 14. By the 1950s, however, it was
clear that the public fora and time, place, and manner doctrines emerging from the
proselytizing cases were speech doctrines primarily, encompassing religious expression
incidentally as a form of speech entitled to equal treatment. See, e.g., Niemetko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). The holding in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943), avoided the Free Exercise Clause, relying on
limitation of governmental ability to coerce speech.
This appears in retrospect to have foretold a change in doctrine announced in
Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-77. Today, the Free Exercise Clause is largely drained of
independent constitutional significance and retains significance often when combined
with equality aspects of speech law. See Richards, supra note 28, at 796. The Court
treated a present day Witness proselytizing claim in the former, mixed free exercise
and speech manner in Watchtower v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 161-62 (2002).
The ordinance appears to have been treated as an invalid prior restraint on religion as
well as speech, over the dissent of Justice Scalia, author of the Smith opinion. Id. at
171 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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largely on their own terms, and may only address the issues they
77
raise for conversation.
Opposing participants were usually local governments that
prosecuted or defended their actions under general police power
ordinances. 78 The First Amendment gave them this role. Explicitly
forbidding Congress from actions regarding an establishment of
religion, denying the free exercise of religion, or abridging freedom of
speech, the text created an underlying assumption of U.S. religious
79
regulation: it is largely local and there should be very little of it.
Religious groups in the United States are justified in assuming
that their activities are allowed unless there is explicit regulation
prohibiting them and that such regulation is to be tested under
federal constitutional standards. Thus, the conversation about the
Witnesses' religious activities largely took place episodically, as topics
arose in state and local rulemaking bodies and as disputes were
brought before the courts, rather than more comprehensively and
abstractly in national legislative bodies.
The conversation about regulation of Witness activities included
more voices than just these parties. Other private, nongovernmental
associations joined. By action of the courts allowing amicus curiae
status, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American
Bar Association (ABA) cooperated with the Witnesses in litigation,
and the ACLU publicized their persecution in its reports. Opposing
them was another group given amicus status, veterans organized
under the American Legion.8 0 A possible participant that joined only
occasionally, the U.S. Department of Justice, did file against local
officials under federal civil rights laws, but was successful only
once.8 1 Other participants, local grand juries, and juries impeded
82
some federal efforts.
Participants took on different roles in different episodes of the
conversation. In a Department of Justice prosecution, the Witnesses

77.
Jurisdictional issues may always be raised by the Court independently of
the parties, however, and may result in a would-be participant being denied.
The chief exception is the military conscription cases, in which the
78.
Witnesses faced more comprehensive federal regulation defended by the national
government and its agencies. McAninch, supra note 1, at 1010-11.
79.
After the 1940 Witness case of Cantwell v. Connecticut, it was made clear
that state and local governments could not interfere with free exercise either. 310 U.S.
at 303.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was allowed to give
80.
substantive legal argument orally in the Gobitis case, as well as filing a brief in that
case and in Barnette. PETERS, supra note 1, at 46, 249. Clergy of established
mainstream Protestant churches endorsed the ACLU publications. Id. at 67. The
American Bar Association filed a brief in both the Gobitis and Barnette cases, and the
American Legion filed a brief opposing the Witness position in Barnette. Id. at 48-49,
248-49.
81.
Id. at 120-21.
82.
Id.
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were victims whom the national government sought to protect under
federal civil rights legislation in the federal courts. Generally, they
were defendants in state court actions brought by state and local
governments under local police power ordinances; the Witnesses'
claimed that the federal constitutional law of speech and religion
prevented their convictions. At times, they were plaintiffs in their
own actions in federal courts, complaining that local governments
violated federal speech and religion protections. 83 The number of
possible participants, claims, courts, and positions made for a
complex, dynamic conversation.
The participants had more than one audience. They not only
spoke to judges and juries, but also to the public, initiating a national
conversation about religious activity and the law. Newspapers and
magazines commented on Witness litigation, especially the school flag
salute cases.8 4 While a few praised Gobitis for upholding the salute
requirement, most condemned it.8 5 Its overruling in Barnette was met
with praise. Professional peers and scholars in legal periodicals
published by law schools also commented on the cases, again
condemning the cases.
Except for rare exceptions, court proceedings are open to the
public and to the press. Court pleadings are public records at all
levels; oral arguments before the Supreme Court and other appellate
courts are open to the public (although seating is limited), and some
state courts allow televised proceedings. By convention, judicial
appellate opinions are published8 6 and available to the public. They
largely form the body of law studied in law schools and analyzed by
scholars. They are criticized methodically in law journals, many of
which are read by judges.
The public took heed of the Court's pronouncements. That is
shown in part by increased persecution of the Witnesses following the
Gobitis decision condoning punishment for their refusal to engage in
patriotic exercises. For example, localities passed ordinances modeled
on the opinion's reasoning.8 7 A Department of Justice memorandum
and ACLU reports demonstrate a striking coincidence between the
Gobitis opinion and a clear increase in local prosecutions of Witnesses
for various offenses.88
In the year of the Gobitis decision, a

83.
See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 159 (1943) (Witnesses
seeking injunctive relief after repeated arrests for violations of the local ordinance);
Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 1947) (Witnesses seeking injunction
after Mayor and town officials insisted on enforcing blockade of town).
84.

PETERS, supra note 1, at 67-68, 232-33.

85.
Id.
86.
Some decisions have only cursory memorandum treatment because of
judicial determination (court rules) of an absence of precedential value.
87.
PETERS, supra note 1, at 249.
88.
Id. at 100; McAninch, supra note 1, at 1020.
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remarkable number of mob attacks on Witnesses proselytizing in
numerous states were reported. 89
The effect on the public was, in turn, noted by the Court in a
conversation among the Justices carried on partially in public. Justice
Murphy, dissenting, noted attacks on Witnesses in a subsequent
Witness case. 90 And Justice Jackson discussed the post-Gobitis
attacks in a draft of the Barnette opinion he circulated to other
91
members of the Court.
3. The Conversational Forum and Its Renewable Subject Matter
The conversation was a public, ongoing, episodic one about the
meaning of the terse text of the First Amendment, in the context of
concrete disputes with local officials and through the adversarial
procedures of the courts. That conversation appears to have effected a
change in the participants and in the meaning of the text under
discussion.
a. A Concrete and Adversarial Conversation
One occasion for speech set by the Constitution is the resolution
of disputes in the courts. 92 In the common-law tradition, this forum is
an adversarial one, in which two opposing parties in an actual
dispute present contrasting views of the law and how it applies to
their factual situation in order to persuade a judge, a neutral
decision-maker, in an open hearing. The constitutional text is held in
common; the contest is between two ideas or narratives to determine
what will constitute the authoritative meaning of the words in a
given situation.
The Jehovah's Witnesses took advantage of this forum, its
adversarial structure, and the large textual "gaps" to be filled by
judges. Their particular faith put them in the position of telling a
narrative, a biblical narrative, to others. It also put them in an
oppositional stance and gave them passion to persuade. Their belief
in the absolute truth of their teachings logically placed them in
opposition-indeed an urgent opposition-to other powers and belief
systems, whether religious or political. And they are remarkably
rational in the sense that they believe that the truth of God's

89.
PETERS, supra note 1, at 100.
90.
"One need only read the decisions of this and other courts in the past few
years to see the unpopularity of Jehovah's Witnesses and the difficulties put in their
path because of their religious beliefs." Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 622 (1942)
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (upholding a license fee on Witness proselytizing).
91.
PETERS, supra note 1, at 251.
92.
U.S. CONST. art. III.
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existence and his plan are apparent and logically deducible. 93 Indeed,
the core of their faith is conversion of the unbeliever.
The nature of their beliefs also meant they had no long-term
political goals to put into a legislative agenda. They simply sought the
protection needed to go about exercising their faith.94 This meant
resorting to the courts, where they could both seek protection and
propagandize their faith.
The adversarial structure of argument in a trial requires each
party to characterize a set of facts differently, while arguing within
the meaning of the shared text. 9 5 In doing so, the parties develop the
tensions inherent in the central foundational text. The Jehovah's
Witnesses' cases demonstrate this well.
When a local government described Witnesses' door-to-door
literature distribution, preaching, and requests for donations as a
nuisance, invasion of privacy, or commercial activity susceptible to
fraud, the Witnesses described them as acts of worship. 96 When a
government described a compulsory flag salute and pledge as a
means to unify the citizenry and aid national security, the Witnesses
described them as compelled disobedience to a divine injunction not
to worship idols. 97 When the government described a Witness
exemption from a licensing fee as a subsidy for religion, the
98
Witnesses described it as a tax on the exercise of their religion.
When the government described a child distributing literature and
asking for donations with her parent as a child abused for labor, the
Witnesses described her as a child being raised in the faith of the
parents. 99 And when the government described angry insults to
arresting officers as "fighting words," the Witnesses described them
as verbal self-defense by one abused by a mob and collusive
officers. 100
The Witnesses' narratives prevailed in several of the instances
described above: the Court held that their activity was exercise of

93.
BECKFORD, supranote 5, at 201-04.
94.
McAninch, supra note 1, at 1076.
95.
The description of how judicial opinions interpret texts in cases is from
James Boyd White, as is that about constitutional conversation generally. See James
Boyd White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of Life, in
HERACLES' Bow 107, 114-117 (1985).
96.
See, e.g., Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938).
97.
See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583
(1943).
98.
See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584 (1942).
99.
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
100.
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 569 (1942).
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religion and speech, rather than littering, insubordination, or selling.
Yet the opinions also recognized the government's legislative goals as
legitimate, but of lesser importance. These cases illustrate an ideal: a
judicial opinion that recognizes what is valid in each competing
narrative and that incorporates those aspects into a coherent
decision.101
Under the common-law method, judges not only decide the
dispute before them, but in the process often adopt or modify a rule
that will operate as law in future cases.10 2 Narratives or
understandings of facts can live beyond a present dispute and
continue to be relevant as factors in (or limits on) a rule, becoming
resources for future cases. This is true even if the court does not
entirely accept a party's version of events. The Witnesses
characterization of a Witness's insults to arresting officers as
protected verbal self-defense in the face of religious persecution did
not prevail. The rule that such "fighting words" can be punished,
however, has since been narrowly interpreted to protect highly
provocative speech, even when directed at police officers.' 0 3 Similarly,
when a judge gives reasons for rejecting a narrative, those reasons
can become limiting factors for applying the rule or distinguishing it
from others. A narrative rejected by the majority may be preserved in
a dissenting opinion and take on new life if the dissent is cited in a
later opinion. In these ways, competing viewpoints can be maintained
10 4
in the conversation, to be called upon in the future.
b. The Common-Law Judge as Audience and Participant
The courts in which the Jehovah's Witnesses conversed with
local governments were profoundly influenced by common-law
tradition. This meant the judiciary was not only an audience and
referee for the parties, but also an active participant in the ongoing
conversation about the meaning of the authoritative text.

See, e.g., White, supra note 95, at 116.
101.
See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
102.
103.
Although Prince refused a free exercise of religion exemption from a child
labor law for Witness children distributing literature and requesting donations with a
parent, the constitutional law of personal privacy based in the substantive aspects of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments includes the rights of
parents to raise and educate their children, see Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923), and another minority
religion was able to secure a religious exemption from truancy laws for their practice of
educating their children. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972). Although
Chaplinsky refused to overturn the conviction of a Witness for offensive and annoying
speech, the doctrine has been circumscribed and rarely used, eclipsed by the doctrine
that even provocative and offensive speech enjoys First Amendment protection. See
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969)
104.
See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
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The U.S. judge is more audience and referee than in the civil-law
tradition, in which judges have a greater role in investigating and
structuring a case. Because of reliance on the common-law method,
the judge in the United States is also a conversational participant. In
appellate argument, judges converse with the attorneys who
investigate and shape the cases in the U.S. system. In a larger sense,
however, the attorneys and the U.S. Supreme Court are in
conversation with the authors of the Constitution, with earlier courts
that have decided similar cases, and with the views of the present
Court's members as expressed in their own earlier opinions. In
addition, the Court is aware that attorneys preparing later cases and
courts deciding them will be an audience for the decision being
currently formulated.
Active judicial participation in the conversation is partially due
to the power of independent, substantive judicial review of legislation
for compliance with the Constitution. Also, the negative injunctive
tone and the brief text of the First Amendment call for judicial
enforcement and interpretation.1 0 5 Judicial activism also arises from
judicial use of the norms of common-law reasoning-even by judges
not on common-law courts and not applying the common law. 10 6 The
Court follows the doctrine of stare decisis, reasoning by analogy to
earlier cases and to historical examples, and invokes general
principles, cultural norms, and practical consequences as reasons for
its decisions.
Judicial activism stems from the power to substantively review
the constitutionality of the actions of other branches of government
and relies on the independence of the judiciary among the
branches.10 7 This extensive power, which itself evolved through
judicial elaboration on the meaning of the text, 0 8 not only gives the
courts voice regarding the meaning of the Constitution, but the
paramount voice.
In the common-law tradition of gradual judicial rule formulation,
the Justices themselves have outlined their role. The Witness cases,

105.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
106.
Generally speaking, state courts are the common-law courts in the United
States. The jurisdiction of the federal courts is restricted largely to enacted sources of
law, the federal Constitution, statutes, regulations, and treaties. While they may apply
state-court-created common law, federal courts generally defer to the state court
system for articulation and interpretation of state common law. Certain subjects, such
as admiralty, are largely of common-law origin, and a type of federal common law has
evolved to address subjects necessary to the judicial function not addressed in enacted
law.
107.
U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178
(1803).
108.

See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178.
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particularly the flag salute cases, illustrate the conversation on this
subject among the Justices. In the first case, Gobitis, the view
prevailed that judicial restraint is appropriate in a democracy and
that popular government is the best means to decide among
competing views of proper regulation. In the last case, Barnette, a
distinct view of judicial voice was adopted: judicial activism is
appropriate in a democracy when the rights of individuals and
minorities are at stake.
Court conversation may take place publicly in the oral argument
of cases, as Justices make points through questioning. It may be in
private, as the Justices meet in conference to discuss cases, vote
preliminarily, and assign the opinion writing, or as they circulate
memoranda and draft opinions among themselves. As the Witness
cases above reveal, judicial conversation may also take place in
footnotes, dissents, and concurrences outlining alternate, proposed, or
rejected views and arguing for their propriety. The position on
judicial review adopted in Barnette followed a proposal on appropriate
judicial activism proposed in a footnote in a Supreme Court case
decided in 1938,109 as well as the reasoning in the Gobitis and Jones I
dissents. 110
The Court's method is that of traditional common-law reasoning.
This is partially because most Justices have practiced law before
being appointed judges, many in litigation, and thereby have become
familiar with the large body of law that even today remains in the
hands of the common-law (state) courts. Their U.S. legal education
also shows the effect of the common law: appellate court opinions are
still primary teaching materials, the skills and techniques of
litigation are the subjects of many courses, and the scholarship
focuses to a great degree on appellate court decisions. Thus, the
Justices in constitutional decision-making tend to reason as commonlaw lawyers; they use the doctrine of precedent, and they openly use
history and policy justifications for a decision often announced with
an accompanying rule that may appear legislative in its detail.
As common-law rules derive from a line of previous cases, they
tend to be complex and highly factual. This can be seen in the law of
permits that came from the Jehovah's Witnesses cases. Seven
discrete elements are necessary for a constitutionally valid permit
ordinance."' Factual distinctions are the acceptable reasons for not
following earlier precedent and become the basis for delineating the
different requirements of and exceptions to a rule. For instance, while
a permit system entirely within an administrator's discretion will fail,

109.
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
110.
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks On Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 133, 148 (1990).
111.
See supra note 40.
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one with neutral and specific standards is considered differently and
may well be upheld, even against Jehovah Witnesses' religious
objections. 1 12 But if the facts differ (e.g., if the permit standard is
vague and simply relies on the discretion of a local official), the
ordinance will not be upheld.
Often, common-law method allows extraction of a larger,
overarching principle encompassing reasons for the rule that is
applicable to cases not as factually analogous to the initial line of
cases. As the authors of such principles, U.S. courts are often more
open about their reliance on history, principle, and policy than are
courts in other legal systems. For example, in the Witness cases, the
justices drew upon U.S. history, analogizing the Witnesses to
religious dissenters in the colonial period.11 3 Among themselves they
debated about the need for a more active judicial approach to disputes
involving minority groups and individual rights.1 14 As it adopted that
approach, the Court also outlined the elements of a broad analytical
approach to judicial review of governmental action alleged to infringe
upon the First Amendment or other fundamental rights, i.e., strict or
115
close scrutiny.
The constitutional conversation on religious regulation in the
United States then, is one largely dominated by a participant with
paramount, final voice, who sets standards for other participants to
meet, whose deliberations are only partially public, and whose
institutional form is not democratically accountable. Changes in
constitutional meaning through the conversation can result from
changes in personnel (i.e., Justices), even relatively few personnel.
The Justices are appointed by a politically accountable chief
executive, and are subject to confirmation by a politically accountable
Senate. Nevertheless, it is expected that the Supreme Court will
speak with an independent voice on broad matters of policy in the
course of deciding disputes.
The Barnette case, in which the Court reversed its prior decision
on coerced patriotic exercises, is a famous example of an opinion in
which the Court evokes broad constitutional principles to justify its

112.
Witness beliefs may prevent even applying for a license, see Watchtower
Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167 (2002); it is offensive to
Jehovah to require a permit for worship.
See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 622 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
113.
114.
See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
115.
Strict scrutiny requires a holding of unconstitutionality unless the
government demonstrates that its action is necessary to serve a compelling government
interest. Id. Likewise, the means chosen must be necessary (i.e., the least restrictive
alternative) to advance that interest. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
As it relates to regulating proselytizing activities, governmental concerns over littering,
though legitimate, were not sufficiently compelling to justify the denial of permits in
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
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decision and to govern subsequent, similar cases. 116 The following is
illustrative: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. 11 7 The subsequent statement is similarly characteristic of
common-law reasoning: "If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to us.' 1 8 It is always possible
that a subsequent conversation may change the law, in which case
the rule will need to be modified in light of the facts of a later case.
c. Renewal of the Meaning of the Conversational Text
The role of the judiciary in the conversation is also key to the
renewal of the meaning of the subject matter of the conversation, the
constitutional text. The conversation explains in part the
effectiveness of the brief written text over so many years of changing
circumstances.
The U.S. courts, when interpreting enacted law, create a
secondary jurisprudence that is necessary to the meaning of the
enactment. This is evident in the Witness cases that established the
law of use and access of public property, the complex law of permit
systems, and the doctrine prohibiting coerced speech. The Witness
decisions altered the meaning of the brief and absolute words of the
First Amendment. Free speech came to be freer in a public forum and
free from vague and standardless requirements, but not free in all
places, at all times, and in any manner. Nor did "free" mean free to
provoke violence with personally directed invective. But "free" did
mean free from the threat of school expulsion for refusal to recite a
patriotic exercise. Furthermore, "free" expanded to mean not only
free from federal government restraint,, but also free from state and
local government restraint. The law changed from a public park or
street being subject to all restrictions the government owner sees fit
to impose, to being presumptively the place most open to speech.
This vast change is certainly not to be deduced from the words of the
constitutional text. Outright reversal of meaning-from allowing local
government to coerce a patriotic exercise over religious objection to

116.

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).

117.

Id. at 642.

118.
Id. In the United States, the doctrine of precedent is more flexible than that
of some other common-law countries, particularly in statutory matters. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992), sets out considerations that guide
the Supreme Court in a decision on overturning one of its own constitutional
precedents. Such considerations include whether the rule has proved itself to defy
practical workability, is subject to reliance that would make overruling inequitable, is a
remnant of abandoned doctrine, or whether facts have so changed or come to be seen so
differently that the rule lacks significant application or justification. Id.
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not allowing it-is an obvious example of judicial construction of
meaning.
The change in meaning is accomplished slowly, through the
common-law reasoning process described above. Cases as components
of common-law rulemaking refine the contours for subjects in later
instances of conversation, similarly to the way the text of the
Constitution sets the overall subject. The facts deemed material in a
case holding will operate to include certain claims within the ambit of
the rule that the case stands for and to exclude others. Thus, once the
Court in Schneider focused on public streets as appropriate arenas for
proselytizing, 1 19 arguments by local governments that they could ban
proselytizing activities entirely because of their ownership of the
streets were precluded. And once the Court ruled that specific and
content-neutral standards to deny a permit for proselytizing activities
were required, 120 it established a new subtopic of conversation. Local
governments could then claim their ordinances were sufficiently
narrow to be nondiscriminatory1 21 or neutral because the same fee
122
was required of everyone distributing literature for sale.
Therefore, while one cannot say that the Jehovah's Witnesses
changed the law of the First Amendment, one can say they played a
role in the process by bringing speech, press, and free exercise of
religion claims. The text, prior precedent, other participants in the
conversation, including the Justices themselves, and the wartime
context, also played a role. Nevertheless, the courtroom forum with
the adversarial presentation of the Witness cases was integral to the
change in meaning that occurred. Because of this evolutionary change
in meaning, one cannot confidently know the meaning of a U.S.
constitutional text without reading the most recent case
interpretation.
This secondary jurisprudence changes the formal hierarchy of
legal sources. While the Constitution is the supreme law, followed by
statutes and common-law rules (to the extent they are not displaced
by statute), cases interpreting the Constitution in effect are on the
same level as the Constitution itself.
Because the Supreme Court's power of constitutional review
extends to state and local legislation and court decisions, the Court is
paramount in the national conversation-it unifies instances of
conversation not only among the federal courts, but also among the
various state court systems. Furthermore, because of the doctrine of

Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160-61.
119.
120.
See id. at 163-64; see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
121.
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941) (State prevailed on
ground that the state court construed a parade ordinance to set nondiscriminatory
standards for permits).
122.
See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1942), vacated by 319 U.S. 103
(1943).
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precedent, the courts speak to one another, as well as to attorneys
and the public, with the latest, highest voice having a ring of finality
on a particular topic of conversation.
4. Varied Topics in a National Conversation
While the text of the Constitution supplies the subject of the
conversation, multiple legal areas can be addressed simultaneously,
affecting many areas of life and governmental action and resulting in
a complex conversation.
Witness cases regarding public property affected the ordinary
administrative law of local governments. 123 Rights of owners of real
property were diminished by a Witness case in which the Court held
that the First Amendment prevented a company town from
restricting Witness proselytizing. 124 The coerced patriotic exercise
cases modified local school law, and another Witness case modified
the state law of unemployment insurance eligibility. 125 Parental
rights, an aspect of family law that is usually a matter of state law,
126
were also affected, as well as child labor.
Occasionally the Court addressed religion in construction of
national statutory law, in which case it conversed, in a sense, with
the Congress. The Court discussed military conscription legislation in
the context of constitutional challenge and upheld military induction
laws that substantially limited the Witness draftees' opportunity to
challenge their validity. But it sent a message to Congress about the
relevance of the First Amendment to military conscription by
suggesting that the First Amendment required that some opportunity
to challenge the validity of draft classifications be provided to
religious objectors. 127
Thus the judicial forum and the role of judges as audience and
participants in the constitutional conversation affect many other
areas of law, adding complexity to the conversation. The power of the
federal courts to impose their voice on matters of federal

See, e.g., Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452. Similarly, the local administrative law of
123.
automotive licensing was restricted by the First Amendment in the Witness case of
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1981).
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
124.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (holding that a Witness
125.
unemployed because of his religiously based refusal to work on military hardware has
a free exercise exemption from state law denying unemployment benefits to those
discharged for misconduct).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1944) (holding that state
126.
child labor laws did not offend the Free Exercise Clause when applied to the time that
children spent distributing Witness literature with their parents).
See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Falbo v. United States, 320
127.
U.S. 549, 553-55. In the former case, Justice Black stated he would have voided the
action on constitutional grounds if the statutory ones had not sufficed.
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constitutional law also means the conversation yields uniform
standards, applicable over a diverse nation with quasi-sovereign state
governments.
5. Instances of Conversation Differing in Time and Setting Create
Repetition, Inconsistency, and Lapses
The constitutional conversation is constructed of repeated
instances of conversation in differing times, factual settings, and
court systems. Even the conversation constituting the meaning of an
aspect of one amendment takes place in repeated episodes. On new
occasions, participants revisit prior instances and may alter their
views. As instances are separate, topics may be dropped or may be
addressed again only several instances later-in new contexts, with
new participants. Thus, conversation can lapse, or instances can be
repetitive or inconsistent, and the meaning thereby constructed is
similarly incomplete or inconsistent.
The Witness cases on access to and use of public property for
First Amendment activities stretched over sixty-four years and built
only gradually into the complex law of constitutional permitting
systems. Cases were repetitive, as when the 1951 Niemotko case
repeated the analysis under which a standardless licensing scheme

was struck in Martin v. City of Struthers (1943), Largent v. Texas
(1943), Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), and Schneider v. State
(1939).128
The Witnesses endured inconsistent, even contradictory
instances of conversation. The most dramatic example of
contradiction is the Court's reversal in Barnette of its 1940 Gobitis
decision, which had upheld expulsion of Witness school children for
refusing to engage in patriotic exercises. 12 9 The assumption behind
stare decisis is that predictability is important in the law, and that
change should happen only gradually and predictably. But the
normal common-law method of distinguishing cases by facts and
formulating additional rule requirements or exceptions does not
explain the change from Gobitis to Barnette. The facts were virtually
identical: in both, Jehovah Witness parents of minor children sued
local school authorities that required school children to participate in
school flag salute exercise, with threat of expulsion for
noncompliance. The law upon which the Witnesses relied was largely
the same. Gobitis had refused a free exercise of religion exemption,
assuming the local authorities had the power to require the patriotic

See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Martin v. City of
128.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
129.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 586 (1940).
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exercise, and the Witnesses in Barnette relied on free exercise as well
as on freedom of speech. In each case, the Witnesses were
represented by the same attorney and aided by the ACLU and ABA
Committee on the Bill of Rights. The federal courts were the common
forum in each instance, and the wartime context remained the same.
Two factors differed, however. First, Barnette was decided in the
context of increased persecution of the Jehovah's Witnesses, both in
violent attacks and prosecutions for various offenses.' 3 0 While the
Gobitis opinion alone certainly did not cause the violence, there was a
"striking coincidence" of timing between its publication and hardships
131
endured by the Witnesses.
Second, the Justices who participated in the conversation
changed as well. Justice Stone, who had dissented in Gobitis, became
Chief Justice after Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes left the
Court, and two new justices were appointed.' 3 2 In addition, three
133
justices who joined the Gobitis opinion changed their views,
making a majority of five against the earlier holding.
The three years between Gobitis and Barnette were a time of
uncertainty, especially because growing dissension was indicated in
an intervening decision on taxation, Jones v. Opelika.134 Jones did not
involve school patriotic exercises, but rather upheld imposition of a
tax on selling printed matter. Yet under common-law reasoning, by
which discrete factual cases resemble one another in terms of larger
principles, there was a similarity. Both involved generally applicable
regulations that, in effect, significantly burdened religious conduct.
Three dissenting justices pointed out the similarity. With the new
appointments to the Court, it appeared that a majority of the
members of the Court had changed their views. Thus, for a period of
time there was a lapse in the conversation: no instance of
conversation articulated the change, and Gobitis stood as precedent.
Such a lapse is not unanticipated. Because judicial lawmaking
relies on litigants to bring cases to the courts, and U.S. constitutional

130.
See supra notes 82 & 83 and accompanying text. In 1940, nearly 1,500
Witnesses endured 335 separate mob attacks in forty-four states. PETERS, supra note 1,
at 100.
131.
McAninch, supra note 1, at 1020.
As Stone was elevated, Justice Jackson took his seat, and Justice Rutledge
132.
took the seat of Justice McReynolds (after a brief period of service by Justice Byrnes).
Both Hughes and McReynolds had joined the Gobitis majority opinion, which was a 9-1
decision.
133.
In Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1942), vacated by 319 U.S. 103
(1943) (per curiam), the Court upheld imposition of a nondiscriminatory license tax on
Jehovah's Witnesses distributing their tracts door-to-door in a 5-4 decision. Dissenting,
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy noted that Jones' approval of a facially
nondiscriminatory action that resulted in burdening a minority's religious exercise was
consistent with the holding in Gobitis, which they now believed was wrongly decided.
Id. at 623-24 (Black, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying note 133.
134.
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law forbids issuance of opinions in cases that are not live
controversies between adverse parties, judges cannot write
comprehensive and complete summaries of the law or correct prior
mistakes on their own. They must await a case that will raise the
issue needing attention. As a result, both the public and the lower
courts may lack guidance.
The Witnesses' chief counsel saw the clues, anticipated a
reversal of Gobitis and, in the tradition of active lawyering that
characterizes the U.S. system, selected the Barnette case to pursue to
the Supreme Court. 135 The lower federal court spoke as well in the
conversation, also anticipating a reversal. It indicated in its opinion
that after the Jones I dissent it felt free to use its own opinion on the
governing rule of First Amendment law, rejecting Gobitis. The lower
court did so even though Gobitis was binding, factually analogous
136
precedent not yet overruled.
D. Assessment and Conclusion
The historical interaction between this new and unpopular
religious movement and the U.S. legal system in many respects
worked well. The movement was protected from the imposition of the
majority's hostile will. Likewise, while resistant to civil authority in
the name of religious belief, the Witnesses ultimately obeyed limits
imposed by the judiciary on their activities. The development of the
law of the Constitution was affected in a manner most U.S. citizens
and legal observers find positive, and the religious movement appears
to have institutionalized into a religion that is less legally and
socially disruptive.
The legal system was marked by a minimum of regulation of
religious activities, most of it at the local level, with enforcement of
brief and broadly termed national constitutional guarantees of
religious freedom entrusted largely to the national judiciary. The
judiciary operated in the common-law method, evolving principles
and rules gradually through a series of cases.
The legal system proved responsive to the particular complaints
of this minority religion, producing nationally binding court decisions
that upheld the legitimacy of their core religious activities. The group
was able to access the system, partly because of their constitutionally
stated status, which they could exploit with claims for relief in the
courts. They were able to narrate their religious version of the events
leading to conflict with the law, and to have an audience in the courts
and in the public at large for their interpretation of the Constitution.

135.

PETERS, supra note 1, at 245.

136.
Barnette v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 252 (S.D. W. Va.
1942), affl'd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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The system was flexible enough to allow them recourse to the courts
when the immediate regulatory authorities were hostile or complicit
in the persecution. It also gave the alternative of resort to federal
courts when relief as defendants in state courts seemed unlikely.
On the other hand, the movement suffered persecution without
clear and uniform relief for at least fifteen years, from 1928 to the
early 1940s. Although they experienced victories in that period, the
victories were episodic, addressing particular factual situations. At
times, they were defeated and, at other times, left uncertain of the
status of their religious actions. Their protection was secured largely
through their own efforts, which required extraordinary organization,
time, and money. The courts as decision-makers were not directly
democratically accountable or completely transparent, and because
the law was unclear and resolution of the disputes was complicated
by alternative fora, claims, parties, and appeals, the process was
inefficient from the viewpoint of the religious movement subject to
regulation.

III. RUSSIA AND

SPAIN: A DISTINCTLY EUROPEAN CONVERSATION

The metaphor of ongoing conversation with religious minorities
and newcomers about the meaning of fundamental, enacted law with
judges as audiences and participants holds for the regulatory systems
of Russia and Spain as well as for the United States, albeit with some
significant distinctions.
A. The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Russia and
Spain
One distinct aspect of the European conversation centers on
international human rights agreements and the courts that enforce
them. For example, both Russia and Spain are bound by Article Nine
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 137 It contains a

137.

It provides that

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, Lealth or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, Sec. I, Art. 9, U.N.T.S 221 (as amended Nov. 1, 1998). Paragraph 2 is of
particular relevance to Witness disputes with civil authorities and was the basis of a
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guarantee of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion that is
absolute until manifest in action, when the limitations may apply. To
justify overriding the freedom, a limitation must pass the tests of
paragraph two, the strictest of which is that it be "necessary in a
democratic society." The European Court of Human Rights has said
this necessarily presupposes religious pluralism, 138 necessitating a
very strict scrutiny of limitations. Thus, while cultural difference in
must be appreciated, this provision and the
this area
nondiscrimination provisions of the Convention require reasonable
and objective criteria for differential treatment, avoidance of blatant
favored religious
or targeted discrimination, and full freedom for less
139
activities.
and
objectives
their
out
carry
to
groups
B. The Role of ConstitutionalCourts in Russia and Spain
Another aspect of the conversation in both Russia and Spain is
the specialized role of constitutional courts. In most of Europe,
including Russia and Spain, "ordinary" judges (those not on the
constitutional court) may only interpret the statute before them; they
may not decide on the constitutionality of a statute. 140 Unlike in the
United States, where any court, state or federal, can hold legislation
unconstitutional, this task is left up to the Constitutional Court in
14 1
Russia and Spain.
These constitutional courts are a relatively recent phenomenon
in Europe, with most countries establishing them after World War
11.142 The Constitutional Court in Russia was only established in
1991,143 while the Constitutional Court in Spain dates back to

decision finding Greek denial of a permit to Witnesses for a house of prayer
objectionable. Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 387 (1996).
Cole Durham, Freedom of Religion or Belief: Laws Affecting the Structuring
138.
of Religious Communities, ODIHR Background Paper 1999/4, at 20 n.31 (Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe Review Conference, September 1999) (citing
Manoussakis, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41).
Id. at 21 n.36 (relying on arts. 1, 14).
139.
Victor Ferreres Comella, The European Model of Constitutional Review of
140.
Legislation: Toward Decentralization, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 461, 463 (2004). The
constitutional court is an entirely separate court made up of judges who are subjected
to an entirely different set of selection processes and standards. Id. at 468.
Id. at 463.
141.
Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Policy-Makers:Lesson From Transition,42 HARV.
142.
INT'L L.J. 247, 251 (2001). Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first to establish
constitutional courts in 1920. Id.; see also Comella, supra note 140. Comella notes that
this dualist system was particularly useful for newly emerging democracies, which
were unable to replace judges appointed under the previous regime, but wanted to
protect their constitutions under their new regimes. Thus, the separate role of the
constitutional court worked well in this situation. Id. at 469.
Marina Thomas, Russian Federation Constitutional Court Decisions on
143.
Russia's 1997 Law, "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Association," 6 INT'L J.
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1978.144 This model of centralized constitutional review developed out
of a concern that a judiciary with unlimited review powers, i.e., the
power
to
hold
legislation
unconstitutional,
would
be
countermajoritarian and undemocratic. 145 These concerns also
underlie the expectation that ordinary judges will presume the
constitutionality of the contested legislation. In fact, they should look
146
for ways to find the legislation constitutional.
Another feature of these centralized constitutional courts is the
review of constitutional issues in the abstract. Unlike the U.S. case or
controversy model, the European model allows consideration of the
constitutionality of legislation in a procedure separate from an actual
controversy among litigants affected by it. This is generally
accomplished either through a constitutional challenge or
constitutional question. 147 Constitutional challenges may be brought
by a variety of official actors: the government, the prosecutor, or a
member of parliament. 148 These challenges generally must be filed
within a certain period of time following a statute's enactment.
Constitutional questions, on the other hand, are referred by ordinary
judges. 149 These questions are raised by a case that the ordinary

NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icnl.org/JOUIRNALIvo
16issl/rel_ thomasprint.htm.
144.
Article 159 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution established the Constitutional
Court. See Si, Spain, The Constitutional Court, available at http://www.sispain.org
englishbpolitics/court/court.html.
145.
See Bugaric, supra note 142, at 253; Comella, supra note 140, at 468.
"Constitutional courts are specialized judicial tribunals exclusively responsible for
deciding constitutional questions. Whereas both state and federal courts in the United
States can rule on constitutional questions, the judicial structure of many European
and other civil-law countries limits judicial review to these specialized constitutional
courts." Id. at 468.
146.
Comella, supra note 140, at 472. Comella points out that some judges may
be reluctant to refer constitutional questions to the constitutional courts because of the
amount of time that it may take for the court to make a determination. Therefore,
"interpretations" may be stretched at times. He also discusses a number of internal
problems with the centralized constitutional court model. These include the problem of
delays, the complexity of modern legislation, and the level of interpretation allowed
ordinary judges. He argues that all of these problems point to the need for greater
decentralization. In addition, external factors, such as an expansion of the ability of
ordinary judges to apply the European Convention on Human Rights, also promote
decentralization. Comella also suggests that ordinary judges should be empowered to
"set aside a statute when the constitutional precedents set by the court make it
relatively clear that this statute is invalid." Id. at 477-82.
147.
Id. at 464.
148.
Id.
149.
Id. at 465; see also Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in
the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW &
SoC'Y REV. 117 (2001). The authors provide the following helpful description of a
hypothetical constitutional case in Russia:
In Russia, our hypothetical litigant (who may be an ordinary citizen or a part of
the government, including a member of the Parliament that passed the law or
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judge is considering. The judge can refer the case to the constitutional
court to decide the constitutional question, which can delay the case
for years. 150 Ultimately, however, the constitutional court will decide
only the constitutional issue, not the case as a whole. In addition,
some countries, including Russia and Spain, allow individual citizens
court if they
to bring a "constitutional complaint" to the constitutional
15 1
believe their fundamental rights have been violated.
C. Russia
1. Introduction
Before the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Russia allowed for a
state religion. 15 2 The Russian monarchy entrusted the Orthodox
Church with several state functions, while other traditional Russian
religious groups, like Muslims, Catholics, Lutherans, Jews, and
Buddhists, were left with a substantially restricted set of rights and
privileges. 153 The events of 1917, however, brought about significant
changes in Russia, as the proclamation of a socialist state was
accompanied by a separation of church and state. 154 The socialist
state's supposed declaration of religious freedom, however, was really

even the President) needs not violate the law to mount a challenge to it, nor
would he begin his case in a lower "ordinary" court. Because he is alleging that
the act violates Russia's Constitution, because the ordinary courts do not decide
constitutional cases, and because the only court that does decide constitutional
cases-Russia's Constitutional Court-does not require concrete controversies
to render decisions, our litigant could take his case directly to that court. The
only similarity of note between his plight and that of his American counterpart
lies in his chances of review: The Russian Constitutional Court is even more
discretionary than the U.S. Supreme Court, deciding in recent years less than
0.3% of the petitions it receives for review.
Id. at 122.
On the other hand, the Russian Constitutional Court issues more informal
"delimitations," responses to petitioners informing them why their case will not be
formally decided. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Negotiations, 18 (1) INT'L
Soc. 219, 229-31 (2003). More than ten times as many delimitations finding the claim
meritorious on the basis of a prior ruling were issued in 200 formal rulings. Id. at 230.
150.
Comella, supra, note 140, at 471. Comella notes that the delay in Spain can
be up to eight years. Id.
Id. at 465. In Spain, the litigant must exhaust all remedies available in
151.
ordinary courts before proceeding to the constitutional court, and the court may decide
an issue of statutory validity in the abstract nevertheless. Id. Direct access appears
greater in Russia. See Scheppele, supra note 149, at 228.
152.
Lev Simkin, Church and State in Russia, in LAW AND RELIGION IN POSTCOMMUNIST EUROPE 261, 261 (Silvio Ferrari & W. Cole Durham, Jr. eds., 2003).
Id.
153.
154.
Id.
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the start of an attack on all religion, especially Orthodoxy, which
15 5
lasted on and off for several decades.
In the 1970s and 1980s, state policy regarding religious
denominations controlled all aspects of church life in Russia. 156 As
religious freedom became increasingly burdened by the mid-1980s,
President Mikhail Gorbachev began the policy of perestroika, under
157
which restrictions on the activities of religious groups were lifted.
The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) 1990 Law
on Freedom of Religion normalized the state's relations with religious
groups (hereinafter, the 1990 Law). 158 The 1990 Law not only
guaranteed the religious liberty of individual citizens, but also of
properly registered religious groups. 159 The Russian Constitution of
1993 subsequently confirmed these guarantees of religious freedom,
helping establish what Gorbachev proclaimed to be "a golden age of
160
religious liberty" in Russia.
Since 1990, the denominational spectrum in Russia has become
more diverse, and groups that were once banned have received the
right to carry out their religious activities. 16 1 Similarly, there is data
indicating a steady increase over the past two decades in the
percentage of religious believers among Russian citizens. 162 And
while determining the actual number of followers for each
denomination would be difficult because of inaccuracies and
conflicting information, 163 the Orthodox Church and Islam are the
two largest faith groups, encompassing around seventy-five percent
and fifteen percent of its people, respectively. 1 64 Other religious

155.
Id. at 261-62.
156.
Id. at 262.
157.
Id.; John Witte, Jr., Introduction-Soul Wars: The Problem and Promise of
Proselytism in Russia, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1998)
158.
Simkin, supra note 152, at 262. After this law's adoption in 1990, the
number of religious organizations in Russia almost quadrupled to 20,200 by the year
2001. Half of these organizations were associated with the Orthodox Church, while the
remainder was composed of roughly 3,000 Islamic, 2,000 Pentecostals, 563 Adventists,
and 330 Jehovah's Witnesses associations, as well as 200 associations each of
Lutherans, Jews, and Buddhists. Id.
159.
Witte, supra note 157, at 5.
160.
Id. at 6-7. Article 14 of the Russian Constitution states that "(1) [t]he
Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be instituted as state-sponsored
or mandatory religion. (2) Religious associations are separated from the state, and are
equal before the law." Russ. CONST. pt. I, art. 14. Article 28 further states that
"[elveryone is guaranteed the right to freedom of conscience, to freedom of religious
worship, including the right to profess, individually or jointly with others, any religion,
or to profess no religion, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious or other
beliefs, and to act in conformity with them." Id. at pt. I, art. 28.
161.
Simkin, supra note 152, at 262.
162.
Id. at 263.
163.
Id. at 263-64.
164.
T. Jeremy Gunn, Russian Federation 4 n.5 (Sept. 4, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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groups represented in Russia include: Protestants, Pentecostals,
Adventists, Baptists, Lutherans, Catholics, Jews, Buddhists, Hare
16 5
Krishnas, Latter-Day Saints, and Jehovah's Witnesses.
2. The Interaction Between the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Russian
Legal System
a. The Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia
The Jehovah's Witnesses organized in Russia in 1891.166 Over
time, the Witnesses have angered a succession of Russian
governments because of their refusal to celebrate national holidays or
perform military service, and their tough intracommunity discipline
and assertive style of proselytizing new converts. 16 7 In fact,
thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses were persecuted and killed in
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin's Gulag prison camps. 168 Moreover, it
was not until the Soviet Union was collapsing in 1991 that the
Jehovah's Witnesses were first legalized as a religious organization in
Russia. 16 9 Today, conflict with local authorities persists, although the
Jehovah's Witnesses claim roughly 130,000 members in Russia, of
170
which more than 10,000 reside in Moscow.
b. Russia's Religion Laws Generally
The principal law governing the relationship between church and
state is the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Associations, as amended on March 26, 2000 (hereinafter, the 1997
Law). 17 1 The 1997 Law replaced the earlier 1990 Law, which had
made registration widely available to religious associations and had
granted them legal entity status. 172 In particular, the 1997 Law
requires all churches not associated with Russia's four "indigenous"
faiths-Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism-to obtain

165.
See id. at 4; Simkin, supra note 152, at 264.
166.
Court Upholds, Enacts Jehovah's Witnesses Ban, MOSNEWS.COM, June 16,
2004, available at http://www.stetson.edul-psteeves.relnews/O406a.html.
167.
Fred Weir, Moscow Ruling Vexes Religious Minorities, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR,
June
22,
2004, available at http://www.stetson.edu/-psteeves.
relnews/0406c.html.
168.
Id.
169.
Id. Currently, the activity of Jehovah's Witnesses is legally recognized in
every European country, including the twenty-five Member States of the European
Union and those republics of the former Soviet Union geographically located in Europe.
Press Release, Administrative Center of Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia, Statement
(June
16,
2004),
available
at
http://www.jwmedia.org/newsroom/index.htm?content=russia.htm.
170.
Court Upholds, Enacts Jehovah's Witnesses Ban, supra note 166.
171.
Gunn, supranote 164, at 8; Simkin, supra note 152, at 265.
172.
Simkin, supranote 152, at 265.
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registration and to accept strict state regulation. 173 But while the
majority of the 1997 Law pertains to state registration of religious
of
associations, it was not principally designed to create a system 174
registration, because this already existed under the 1990 Law.
Instead, the 1997 Law was principally designed to mandate reregistration of previously recognized religious groups in order to
make it more difficult for certain groups to retain their recognized
legal status.175
Not surprisingly, the adoption of the 1997 Law resulted in
growing concerns from the international community, which sought
more protection for religious minorities in Russia. 176 President Boris
Yeltsin vetoed the 1997 Law as originally enacted, resulting in the
adoption of the so-called compromise version of the 1997 Law. 177 Like
its predecessor, this revised version of the 1997 Law was adopted by
the Russian Parliament under the stated purpose of limiting the
influx of foreign denominations into Russia.1 7 8 A more significant
motive of the revised 1997 Law, however, was to protect the Russian
Orthodox Church. 179 The 1997 Law encroaches on the rights of those
not belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church by means of various
discriminatory measures, such as terminating a religious group's
lease on a building used for worship.' 80 Repressive components of the
law, which stress the supremacy of federal law in the area of religious
freedom, have led many local governmental administrations to
conclude that they are free to deal with religious minorities on a local
to
level.' 8 ' As a result, it is likely that regional laws will continue
8 2
create challenges for Jehovah's Witnesses' activities in Russia.1
c. Registration of Jehovah's Witnesses Under the 1997 Law
Perhaps the most important, yet controversial, provisions of the
1997 Law are those that govern the re-registration of religious
organizations. 183 The 1997 Law required all religious groups to reregister before 2000 (which was later extended by amendment to

173.
Weir, supra note 167. "It has been reported that there are currently around
21,000 local congregations belonging to 59 different faiths registered by the federal
authorities in Russia." Id.
174.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 9.
175.
Id.
176.
Simkin, supra note 152, at 265.
177.
Id. at 265-66.
Id. at 266.
178.
179.
Id.
180.
Id. at 267.
181.

Id.

182.
183.

Id.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 8, 20.
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2001).184 Such provisions have resulted in court decisions that have
5
effectively eliminated some of the re-registration obstacles.18
One major re-registration obstacle was the 1997 Law's
requirement that all previously recognized religious groups supply
written documentation proving their existence in Russia for at least
fifteen years (i.e., from before 1982).186 Those groups that were
unable to provide this documentation, like the Jehovah's Witnesses
(which was legalized around 1991), would be required to re-register
each year for fifteen years.'8 7 The Jehovah's Witnesses brought suit,
and in November 1999, Russia's Constitutional Court effectively
voided this re-registration obstacle. 188 Although the Court upheld the
clause in the 1997 Law that required religions applying for
registration to show documentation of their presence in Russia for at
least fifteen years, it ruled in favor of the Jehovah's Witnesses
bringing the case when it held, inter alia, that the proof of existence
requirement does not apply to groups that were recognized before the
1997 Law took effect. 189 Thus, while this ruling is of little help to
religious groups not recognized in Russia before 1997, it does
eliminate one of the most onerous provisions of the 1997 Law for
those who were. 190
d. Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow Under the 1997 Law
Although the Jehovah's Witnesses have obtained federal
registration pursuant to the 1997 Law in nearly 400 communities
throughout Russia, they have experienced trouble in trying to legalize

184.
Id. at 20.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.; Simkin, supra note 152, at 265.
187.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 20. The reason for this fifteen-year requirement
was that Gorbachev's perestroika, which had begun lifting restrictions on religious
groups in the mid-1980s, occurred less than fifteen years before the original reregistration deadline of 2000. As a result, all new religious groups that arose during
perestroika would not qualify for re-registration and, therefore, would have trouble
retaining their recognized legal status. Simkin, supra note 162, at 265.
188.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 21.
189.
Id.; Press Release, Jehovah's Witnesses' Public Affairs Office, Jehovah's
Witnesses Win Russian Constitutional Case, but Court Upholds 15-year Rule in 1997
Religion Law (Nov. 22, 1999) (on file with author).
190.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 21. In a 2000 decision, the Constitutional Court
preserved the status of another religious association registered before the 1997 law as
a foreign religious organization, the Russian branch of the Roman Catholic Society of
Jesus, holding it would not lose any privileges it had before the 1997 law took effect. Id.
And in a similarly reasoned decision, the Court held in 2002 that the Salvation Army's
Moscow organization could not be liquidated without finding illegal action, as it had
been registered before 1997 but had not re-registered because of technicalities. Id.
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their Moscow chapter. 191 It was originally alleged that the activities
of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow posed a threat to Russian
society. 192 After conducting an inquiry, prosecutors ultimately
charged the Moscow congregation in May 1998 with provoking
religious strife, dividing families, infringing on individual rights,
encouraging suicide by enjoining members to refuse medical
assistance (e.g., rejecting blood transfusions), and urging citizens to
ignore civic obligations (e.g., military service). 193 Under Article 14 of
the 1997 Law, such actions may result in the loss of a religious
organization's legal status and a ban on all its activities even if it has
194
legally registered.
Court hearings into this case began in September 1998.195 On
February 23, 2001, a lower court dismissed the charges against the
Jehovah's Witnesses, but prosecutors successfully appealed this
verdict in May 2001, after which a retrial was ordered. 196 On March
26, 2004, the Golovinsky Intermunicipal District Court ruled in favor
of the prosecution and declared a ban on all organized activities of the
Jehovah's Witnesses chapter in Moscow. 1 97 This holding marked the
first outright banning of a religious organization under the 1997
Law. 198 In turn, the Jehovah's Witnesses appealed, arguing both that
the prosecution lacked sufficient evidence of any wrongdoing and that
the District Court's ruling violated the European Convention on
Human Rights, to which Russia is a signatory. 199 In particular,
attorneys for the group contended that the ban breaches the

191.
Steven Lee Myers, Moscow Court Keeps Ban on Jehovah's Witnesses, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2004, at A6; Weir, supra note 167; see also Geraldine Fagan, Russia:
Court Bans Jehovah's Witnesses, FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 29, 2004, available at
http://www.foruml8.org. The Moscow chapter was initially registered as a religious
group in December 1993, but it has been refused re-registration under the 1997 Law on
five separate occasions. Id.
192.
Myers, supra note 191.
193.
Lawyers Challenge Resolution Banning Jehovah's Witnesses, ITAR-TASS,
June 16, 2004, available at http://www.stetson.edu/-psteeves.relnews/0406a.html;
Weir, supra note 167; see also Fagan, Russia: Court Bans Jehovah's Witnesses, supra
note 191. The origins of this trial date back to June 1995 when the Committee for the
Salvation of Youth from Totalitarian Sects (a social organization with no formal
connection to the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church) filed a
complaint requesting that a criminal prosecution be launched into the Moscow chapter.
Id.
194.
Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Jehovah's Witnesses Ban Comes Into Effect,
FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, June 17, 2004, available at http://www.foruml8.org.
195.
Lawyers Challenge Resolution Banning Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note
194.
196.
Fagan, Russia: Court Bans Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 191.
197.
Id.; see also Fagan, Russia: Jehovah's Witnesses Ban Comes Into Effect,
supra note 194. While this ruling was to have no legal force or effect until after the
appeals process had concluded, many Jehovah's Witnesses in and around Moscow
reported immediate adverse consequences as a result of the holding. Id.
198.
Fagan, Russia: Jehovah's Witnesses Ban Comes Into Effect, supra note 194.
199. Id.
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Convention's specific guarantees of religious freedom, freedom 2of
association, and nondiscrimination on religious grounds. 00
Nevertheless, on June 16, 2004, after a four-hour hearing, a threejudge panel of the Moscow City Appeal Court adjourned for only five
20 1
minutes before upholding the district court's decision.
Because it is new precedent, it is still uncertain exactly how this
ban will be enforced. 20 2 Even so, it is likely that the 10,000 plus
Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow will be forbidden from renting
premises for their religious services, from distributing literature, and
from officially assembling to profess their faith. 203 Furthermore,
while prosecutors suggested that the Moscow branch could still
function without registration, the court resolution clearly states that,
in addition to losing its status as a legal entity, the group must cease
20 4
all its activities.
Unless the Kremlin steps in to suspend the ban, the Jehovah's
Witnesses recourse is in the courts. 20 5 While they had-and still
have-the option of appealing the decision within the Russian judicial
system, 20 6 they have, instead, decided to seek recourse from the
European Court of Human Rights. 20 7 That Court has the authority to
annul legal holdings in Russia at any level, 20 8 and it has repeatedly
declared the Jehovah's Witnesses to be a "known religion" entitled20to
9
protection under international conventions that Russia has signed.
The greatest potential fallout of this legal ruling is that it has
the likelihood of extending not only to Jehovah's Witnesses in other

200.
Id.
Myers, supra note 191.
201.
202.
Fagan, Russia: Jehovah's Witnesses Ban Comes Into Effect, supra note 194.
203.
Myers, supra note 191; Weir, supra note 167.
204.
Fagan, Russia: Jehovah's Witnesses Ban Comes Into Effect, supra note 194.
205.
Weir, supra note 167.
206.
Myers, supranote 191.
Court Upholds, Enacts Jehovah's Witnesses Ban, supra note 166; Fagan,
207.
Russia: Jehovah's Witnesses Ban Comes Into Effect, supra note 194. The Jehovah's
Witnesses filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights pertaining to
the instant case (and the refusal of Moscow authorities to re-register the religious
group) in December 2001; in June 2003, the European Court submitted questions to
the Russian government regarding its treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow.
Press Release, Jehovah's Witnesses' Office of Public Information, Moscow Appeal Court
Outlaws 11,000 Jehovah's Witnesses Who Brace for Return to Soviet Era (June 16,
2004), available at http://www.jw-media.org/newsroomindex.htm?content=russia.htm.
The right of registered faith communities to meet in modern-day Russia will also be
addressed by the European Court in Kuznetsov and Others v. Russian Federation
(hearing set for Sept. 9, 2004), in which a religious meeting of 150 deaf or partially deaf
Jehovah's Witnesses in Chelyabinsk was illegally terminated by governmental
authorities. Press Release, Jehovah's Witnesses' Office of Public Information, Deaf
Russian Citizens Take Fight For Religious Freedom to the European Court (Sept. 6,
2004), available at http://www.jw-media.org/newsroom/index.htm? content=russia.htm.
208.
Fagan, Russia: Court Bans Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 191.
209.
Weir, supra note 167.
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Russian cities, but to other religious minorities in Russia as well. 2 10
This possibility is supported by several recent examples of official and
unofficial harassment of Jehovah's Witnesses and other minority
religious faiths in Russia. 211 The ban may be evidence of Russian
authorities seeking greater control over religious affairs than a
reaction to wrongdoing on the part of the Jehovah's Witnesses in
2 12
Moscow.
3. Conclusion
In Russia, the Witnesses have encountered a more
comprehensive and complete system of religious regulation than in
the United States, although on examination it proved more episodic
and mutable than it might initially appear. That system initially
excluded or repressed the Witnesses, leaving them without legal
status under both the monarchy and the socialist state. Finally
gaining some legal status as a religious group after 1990, they were
subject to restrictions on their activities under the registration
requirements of the 1997 statute, restrictions that gave them a
subordinate or ambiguous status vis-A-vis the more established
religions.
Their challenge to the 1997 law resulted in the 1999 Russian
Constitutional Court decision that not only applied the re-registration
limitations of the law, but also so broadly interpreted them that one
could safely say it changed their content. The Jehovah's Witnesses
thus had an effect on the law, changing their legal status from one of
subordination and ambiguity to one of equality and clarity. The
decision lessened the ability of local or national governments to
restrict their activities. And the change was not merely in their
status; as it enlarged the category of those not subject to the proof of
existence requirement, it changed the status of all religious groups
recognized at the time the 1997 law was enacted.
Nevertheless, the 1999 decision was limited. The Court did not
settle the validity of the 1997 law's registration restrictions under the
Russian Constitution or under the equality provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Nor did it settle the
Witnesses' ongoing dispute under other provisions of the 1997 law

210.
Myers, supra note 191; see also Weir, supra note 167 (stating that, in 2003,
1,900 warnings were issued to various religious groups, resulting in the filing of 246
court applications to close down specific local religious communities).
211.
Myers, supra note 191; see also Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Jehovah's Witness
Rental Contracts Cancelled, FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 13, 2004, available at
http://www.foruml8.org; Geraldine Fagan, Russia: Sacked For Being Jehovah's
Witnesses,

FORUM

18

NEWS

SERVICE,

May

4,

2004,

available

http://www.forum18.org.
212.
Court Upholds, Enacts Jehovah's Witnesses Ban, supra note 166.

at

20051 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSA TIONS AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS 661

with local authorities in Moscow, the city in which they are most
numerous and were banned in 2004. The Witnesses have appealed
that action under the European Convention on Human Rights to the
European Court of Human Rights, bypassing appeals available in the
Russian court system.
D. Spain
1. Introduction
Medieval Spain was known for its dramatic examples of religious
tolerance2 13 and intolerance. 2 14 But since at least 1492-when
Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella united Spain by defeating
the last Muslim holdouts of the Moors' reign, thereby ending the
several-hundred year conflict known as the reconquista-the most
prominent and lasting feature of the church-and-state relationship in
215
Spain has been the status given to the Roman Catholic Church.
Particularly during the authoritarian dictatorship of General
Francisco Franco from 1939 to 1975, Roman Catholicism enjoyed
many rights and privileges not afforded other religions in Spain.2 16 In
fact, in accordance with the 1945 Law of the Spanish People, the 1953
Concordat with the Holy See, and various state laws and practices,
Catholicism was identified as the state religion of Spain, while all
other religions were given no legal status whatsoever. 217 Around the
its laws and, in 1967
mid-1960s, however, Spain began liberalizing
218
non-Catholic religions were legalized.

For instance, during the Middle Ages, the Spanish town of Cordoba was
213.
considered one of the world's eminent centers of learning, where Islamic, Jewish, and
Christian scholars were all allowed to gather. T. Jeremy Gunn, The Kingdom of Spain
5, 9 (May 20, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Dionisio
Llamazares FernAndez, Religious Minorities in Spain. A New Model of Relationships?,
Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR) International Conference on Minority
Religions, Social Change, and Freedom of Conscience (June 2002), available at
http://www.cesnur.org/ 2002/slclllamazares.htm.
Perhaps the most famous example of religious intolerance in Spain is the
214.
notorious Spanish Inquisition, during which heretics were often imprisoned or burned
alive. Gunn, supranote 164, at 5, 9-10.
215.
Id. at 5-7, 9-10. The religious homogeneity of modern-day Spain is said to
be a direct result of the fifteenth-century promulgation of Catholicism as the state
religion, the forced deportation of Jews and Muslims, and the establishment of the
Inquisition. Id. at 10; see also Fernindez supra note 213.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 3, 6. For example, the state paid the salaries of
216.
Catholic priests, financed the building projects of the Church, outlawed divorce and
contraception, and endorsed Catholic religious education in public schools. Id. at 3.
Only briefly, in the revolutionary years of the 1870s and 1930s, was this privileged
status interrupted. Id. at 3 n.2, 11.
217.
Id. at 3, 7-8.
218.
Id. at 4, 12.

662

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.'613

Following Franco's death in 1975, Spain was confronted with the
difficult problem of defining the relationship between church and
state. 219 In 1978, this problem was addressed through the adoption
of a new Constitution, which created a legal regime for religion and
law. 220 The Spanish Constitution of 1978 guaranteed the freedom of
religion for individuals and communities, and it did away with the
notion of a state religion. 22 1 While the overwhelming majority of the
Spanish population is still Catholic, 22 2 minority religious groups are
now generally free to practice their respective faiths. 22 3 With the
exception of the formerly Communist countries in Europe, Spain is
the one European country that has made the most dramatic and
22 4
democratic changes in its religion laws.
2.

Interaction Between the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Spanish

Legal System
a. Spain's Religion Laws Generally
Since Franco's death in 1975 and the adoption of the new
Constitution in 1978, Spain's political system has been that of a
parliamentary monarchy. 225 Within this political system, the King is
symbolically the head of state, a democratically elected bicameral
parliament constitutes the legislature, and an elected President is the
head of government. 22 6 The judicial power of the Spanish government

219.
220.
221.
concerning

Id. at 12.
Id. at 4.
Id. The text of the Spanish Constitution includes the following language
the freedom of religion:

Freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individuals and communities is
guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression than may be
necessary to maintain public order as protected by law. No one may be
compelled to make statements regarding his or her ideology, religion or beliefs.
No religion shall have a state character. The public authorities shall take into
account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and shall consequently maintain
appropriate cooperation relations with the Catholic Church and other
confessions.
SPAIN CONST. pt. I, ch. 2, div. 1, § 16.
222.
Augustin Motilla, Religious Pluralism in Spain: Striking the Balance
Between Religious Freedom and ConstitutionalRights, 2004 BYU L. REV. 575; see also
Gunn, supra note 164, at 4, 6-7 (estimating that between 90 percent and 99 percent of
the Spanish population in 2001 was Roman Catholic).
223.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 4.
224.
Id.
Alejandro Torres Guti~rrez, Religious Minorities in Spain: A New Model of
225.
Relationships?, Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR) International
Conference on Minority Religions, Social Change, and Freedom of Conscience (2002),
available at http://www.cesnur.org/2002/slc/torres.htm.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 13.
226.
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is vested in an independent judiciary, whose highest court is the
Supreme Court of Justice. 22 7 Spain is a civil-law system and, unlike
common-law systems, the case law of its courts acts 228as a
complementary source of law and not necessarily as precedent.
The laws governing religion in Spain are primarily derived from
five sources.2 29 First, the Constitution of 1978 contains numerous
230
provisions that directly pertain to religious rights in Spain.
Specifically, the Spanish Constitution recognizes the fundamental
rights of religious liberty and freedom of worship for both individuals
under the law with
and groups. It purports to accord equal treatment
231
no discrimination on the basis of religion.
Second, Spain is subject to the treaties and decisions of various
international human rights instruments.2 3 2 For example, as a
member of the European Union, Spain is subject to the decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of
Justice. Third, the 1980 Organic Law of Religious Freedom serves as
the country's primary law on religion, insofar as it discusses in detail
the right of religious freedom in Spain and establishes the procedures
for religious organizations to become legally recognized (these
procedures do not apply to the Catholic Church, however). 23 3 Fourth,
Spain's religion laws are derived from the bilateral agreements
negotiated between religious groups and the Spanish state (discussed
below).2 3 4 And finally, the laws governing religion in Spain come
from other laws that have either a direct or indirect effect on religious
23 5
matters (e.g., Spain's Penal Code).
One concern with the various sources of Spain's religion laws is
the lack of precision and uniformity with which terms like "religion"
and "religious purpose" are defined. 23 6 Also problematic is the fact
that Spain does not have a uniform ecclesiastical law that is applied
equally to all religions.23 7 Instead, Spain has three legal regimes that
govern the rights and privileges of the various religious
denominations in the country. 23 8 While Spanish law asserts that all
individuals and groups are entitled to basic constitutional protections

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 13-14.
at 14.
at 14-15.
at
at
at
at
at
at

15-16.
16.
16-17.
17.
18-20.
4.
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for freedom of religion, these three legal regimes provide23 different
9
benefits to religious entities depending on their legal status.
The first legal regime consists of a series of agreements from
1976 to 1979 between the Spanish state and the Holy See on behalf of
the Roman Catholic Church.2 40 The rules that govern the legal status
of the Catholic Church in Spain are derived from these
agreements. 24 1 This arrangement affords many benefits for the
Catholic Church. For instance, the Spanish state provides direct
financing (via taxation) almost exclusively to the Catholic Church.
The state funds Catholic religious education in public schools and
pays for Catholic clergy in the military.
The second legal regime is the 1980 Organic Law, which is the
most far-reaching religion law in Spain and which primarily applies
to non-Catholic religions. 242 Most notably, non-Catholic religions are
governed by the Organic Law's provisions regarding the registration
of religious groups. A religious group that seeks legal recognition
must register with the Ministry of Justice and provide documentation
to support its claim that it is a religion. Groups that have not
successfully registered-most notably the Scientologists-are treated
as cultural associations and they may appeal to the courts. 243
The third legal regime consists of agreements between the
Spanish state and the different non-Catholic religions, and they
require ratification by the Spanish Parliament. 244 Under this third
regime, however, non-Catholic religions may enter into an agreement
only if the Spanish state decides that it wants to do so (i.e., nonCatholic groups have no legal right or entitlement to enter into
agreements). 245 This unique "agreement" approach of the Spanish

239.
Id. at 30. Religious groups in Spain are not required to register with the
state in order to receive the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom; however,
such groups must register if they wish to become legally recognized and receive the
accompanying benefits. Id. at 23.
240.
Id. at 4, 16, 24-25. For the most part, the Roman Catholic Church in Spain
is governed by a legal regime that is separate from the regime governing minority
religions.
Id. at 24.
241.
242.
Id. at 4, 16, 25-27.
243.
Id. at 4, 25-27.
244.
Id. at 4-5, 16-17, 27-29. So far, these bilateral agreements of the third legal
regime have successfully been entered into with the Spanish state by three wellestablished religious federations in Spain: the Federation of Evangelical Religious
Entities (which includes many, but not all, [non-Catholic] Christian churches); the
Federation of Israelite Communities of Spain (on behalf of Jewish groups); and the
Islamic Commission of Spain (on behalf of Muslim groups). Id. at 5, 27. But note that
even though Protestants, Jews, and Muslims have official status in Spain, each group
is seeking changes to its respective agreements with the state that would, in turn, give
them privileges similar to those enjoyed by the Roman Catholic Church. Peter Juviler,
Freedom and Religious Tolerance in Europe, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 855, 865 (2003) (book
review).
245.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 5.
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model lacks the equal application of neutral laws to all religions, with
those in the third regime being excluded from the benefits (e.g., tax
exemptions) of the agreement system because they lack the political
24 6
support to induce the Spanish state to enter into negotiations.
Although regional legislatures have some autonomy over
regional matters, the main religion laws in Spain are decided and
enforced at the national level.2 47 To this end, the Ministry of Justice
is mainly responsible for regulating religion in Spain (e.g., overseeing
the registration of religious organizations). 248 Ultimately, the Spanish
state claims to be committed to the equality of all religious groups,
regardless of a group's beliefs.2 49 The Catholic Church, however, still
receives many benefits from the state that are largely unavailable to
250
other religions in Spain.
b. Treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses Under Spain's Religion Laws
There are reported to be more than 100,000 Jehovah's Witnesses
residing in Spain. 25 ' In fact, there are said to be more Jehovah's
Witnesses in Spain than Jews or Muslims. 252 Even so, it was not until
recently that the Jehovah's Witnesses movement was registered as a
"Religious Entity" with Spain's Ministry of Justice. 253 Despite their
legal status, however, the Jehovah's Witnesses have been unable to
negotiate agreements with the Spanish state and, therefore, they do
not receive tax exemptions and other benefits given to those religious
groups with which the state has an agreement (e.g., Jews, Protestant
Christians, and Muslims). 254 For instance, in 1994, the Jehovah's

246.
Id. at 5, 16-17.
247.
Id. at 14.
248.
Id. at 17.
Juviler, supra note 244, at 864-65.
249.
Gunn, supra note 164, at 20-22. For instance, the Spanish state provides
250.
direct financing (via taxation) for religion, yet does so almost exclusively to the Catholic
Church. Id. Similarly, the state funds Catholic religious education in public schools and
pays for Catholic clergy in the military. Id. at 21-22.
251.
See, e.g., Watchtower, Statistics:2004 Report of Jehovah's Witnesses Worldwide,
available at http://www.watchtower.orglstatistics/worldwide_report.htm (reporting around
108,000 Jehovah's Witnesses and over 1300 congregations in Spain for the year 2003);
Jehovah's Witness Statistics, available at http://www.prayextremadura.info/id382.htm
(reporting close to 104,000 Jehovah's Witnesses in Spain, or about 0.26 percent of the
country's population, for the year 2000, but noting that the number of members in Spain
has been on the decline since 1997, following many years of rapid growth).
252.
Rafael Palomino, The Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and
the State of Israel: A Third Anniversary Perspective-Church-StateAgreements in
Spain, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 477, 489 (1998).
Motilla, supra note 222, at 575, 584; see also Gunn, supranote 164, at 22-23
253.
(noting that many new religious groups in Spain have been unable to successfully
register as a Religious Entity).
Gunn, supra note 164, at 22; Javier Martinez-Torron, Freedom of Religion
254.
in the Case Law of the Spanish Constitutional Court, 2001 BYU L. REV. 711, 753.
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Witnesses asked the Spanish state to enter into an agreement, but
were rejected on account of the group's conscientious objections to
such as military service and
participating in civic obligations,
2 55
receiving blood transfusions.
The Witnesses' rejection of blood transfusions, particularly with
respect to their children, has often resulted in hostility among
Spaniards, who believe such decisions are inconsistent with
traditional Spanish family values.25 6 As the number of Jehovah's
Witnesses has increased in Spain, so too has the number of deaths of
regarding medical
of parental decisions
children because
treatment. 2 57 Spain's Constitutional Court addressed the issue of
Jehovah's Witnesses' rejection of blood transfusions for their children
in July 2002.258 In that case, Witness parents were charged with
homicide after they refused to convince their ill thirteen-year-old son
that he needed to receive a blood transfusion. 259 A Spanish court had
ordered the blood transfusion to save the minor's life, but the boy
refused to receive the transfusion. 26 0 Basing its decision on the
Spanish Constitution's religion clauses, the Court held that requiring
parents to convince their child of something radically opposed to their
religious beliefs goes beyond their duty as parents and violates their
right to freedom of religion. 261 The Court reasoned that while parents
may not disobey a court order mandating a blood transfusion, they
are not obligated to convince their child to do something that
contradicts their religious beliefs. Thus, this case marked a
262
significant legal victory for Jehovah's Witnesses.
3. Conclusion
As in Russia, the Witnesses in Spain encountered a more
comprehensive and nationally uniform system of religious regulation
than in the United States, although on examination it has recently
proved more episodic and mutable than is immediately apparent.
While it has not given the Witnesses equal voice with other religions,

255.
S.T.C. , July 18, 2002 (No. 154); see also Jose de Sousa e Brito, Political
Minorities and the Right To Tolerance: The Development of a Right To Conscientious
Objection in Constitutional Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 607, 631-33 (discussing Jehovah's
Witnesses' conscientious objection to military service).
256.
Jehovah's Witness Statistics, supra note 251.
Id.
257.
258.
S.T.C., July 18, 2002 (No. 154).
The lower court found that the child's parents had not taken all necessary
259.
measures to prevent their son's death. See id.
260. Id.
Id.
261.
262.
Id. Compare this case's holding with that of S.T.C., Oct. 28, 1996 (No. 166),
in which Spain's Constitutional Court ruled that a Jehovah's Witness did not have a
right to reimbursement from the state for medical expenses resulting from his
conscientious objection to blood transfusions. Martinez-Torron, supra note 254, at 752.
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it has been flexible in response their particular claim for protection
from uniform and otherwise religiously neutral criminal laws
applicable to specific religiously motivated conduct.
Like the Russian system, the Spanish system only gave the
Witnesses and other new or minority religious groups legal status
relatively recently, in 1967. Like that of Russia in 1993, the
Constitution of 1978 included them in substantive guarantees of
freedom of belief, religion, and worship, defining permissible
limitations. The Spanish Constitution, however, did not include the
word "equality." While it prohibited a "state character" for any
religion, it directed "cooperation relations" between the state and
religion. By making "the religious beliefs of Spanish society" relevant
to this task, and explicitly naming only the Catholic Church, it allows
263
disparate treatment for the Catholic Church.
In another parallel with Russia, subsequent legislation gave the
Witnesses and other minority religions subordinate status and
benefits. Following the 1978 constitutional mandate, the 1980 law
outlined a regime that gives the Catholic Church a status and
benefits superior to those of the Witnesses and other minority
religious groups. State conduct allowed under the law further
subordinated the Witnesses, refusing them agreements while giving
benefits to other non-Catholic religious minorities.
The Witnesses do not appear to have challenged their
subordinate status under either the European Convention on Human
Rights or under the Spanish Constitution, but they did base their
blood transfusion defense on the Spanish Constitution. The 2002
decision of the Constitutional Court not only protected Witness
parents in a blood transfusion controversy from criminal prosecution,
but acts as a complementary source of law that may affect later court
decisions under the Constitution.

IV. DISTINCT AND COMMON ASPECTS OF THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN
CONVERSATIONS

The metaphor of a constitutional conversation describes the
contemporary experience of the Jehovah's Witnesses with
constitutional adjudication in Russia and Spain and their earlier
experience in the United States, and it allows some comparisons.
Relatively new constitutions in Russia and Spain set the terms of an
ongoing public conversation about religious freedom in which
minority religions have voice and no other religion speaks with state
authority, in a judicial forum with power to compel government to
speak on the same terms. Although the conversations are relatively

263.

SPAIN CONST. pt. I, ch. 2, div. 1, § 16(3).
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recent, over a period of time they can alter the meaning of the
enacted texts that are their subject matter.
The U.S. conversation and the ones taking place in these
European countries are significantly different. The European
conversation cannot alter its subject matter as profoundly as the U.S.
conversation has proved capable of doing. The United States
conversation is more complex and dynamic, as is the resulting law of
free speech and religion, while the European conversation is
structured to result in more predictable rules and yield more fair and
efficient enforcement. The structure of the U.S. conversation may
allow greater responsiveness to minority religions, however.
A. Common ConversationsAbout Religious Freedom
The opinions of the Spanish and Russian constitutional courts
examined here demonstrate instances of courtroom conversation
about the meaning of religious freedom in each country. The
Witnesses are a minority religion in both, at one time not legally
permitted in regimes that sanctioned certain state religions (and one
that suppressed all religious activity for a long period). In each
country, relatively new constitutions guarantee religious freedom and
prohibit a state religion, allowing "cooperation agreements" with the
state in the case of Spain, "equality" in the case of Russia.
Comprehensive
legislation implements each. Newly created
constitutional courts are empowered to hear claims initiated by
members of minority religions under these enactments and to set
aside legislation violating religious freedom. The constitutional courts
publish opinions following public, adversarial hearings. And each
constitutional court has heard claims stated by the Witnesses under
the constitutional and statutory texts and ruled in their favor.
These opinions also reveal that the instances of courtroom
conversation are part of an ongoing conversation, with the potential
to influence the meaning of the constitutional and statutory texts
being applied. The opinions of constitutional courts in Russia and in
Spain refer to prior cases. The 1999 Russian Constitutional Court
opinion introduced a new distinction into the challenged legislation
that protected the Jehovah's Witnesses from re-registration burdens.
In later cases under the statute, the Court applied the distinction as
though it were part of the law, protecting the Society of Jesus and the
Salvation Army as religious associations recognized by the state
before the 1997 law. By modifying the statute's application, the
opinion altered the parameters of later conversations. In this sense, a
conversation with the Witnesses in a court case is part of a
conversation that will continue between religious groups and future
judges of the Russian Constitutional Court. This conversation has
altered the meaning of a statutory text in a constitutional challenge

20051 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSA TIONS AND NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS 669

and has the potential to alter the meaning of the constitutional texts
themselves.
Thus, the metaphor of conversation describes legal treatment of
new religious movements and religious minorities in these European
countries as it does in the United States. The European
conversations, however, are significantly distinct from the
conversation in the United States.
B. The Russian and Spanish ConversationsAre Unlikely to Alter
Their Subject Matters as Profoundly as Has the Conversation in the
United States
Several distinctions in the parameters of the conversations
explain the profound impact the Jehovah Witnesses' litigation had on
the constitutional law of the United States. These distinctions affect
the ability of the conversation to alter the meaning of the
authoritative texts that define its terms, and the ability of a religious
group to negotiate legal meaning in the courts. They also provide a
basis to predict that the effect of religious minorities on the
fundamental human rights law in these European countries may be
less profound.
1. Length of the Conversations
New and minority religions became participants in conversations
about the meaning of religious freedom in both European countries by
new constitutions adopted in the last third of the twentieth century.
The onset of conversation about the meaning of those guarantees in
courts with relative political independence and entrusted with the
task of reviewing legislation for compliance with the constitutions is
quite recent, twenty-six years ago in Spain and only eleven years ago
in Russia.
Judicial conversation about the meaning of religious freedom as
protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution has been
much longer. Ratified in 1791, the First Amendment has been
discussed with greater frequency in the courts since it was made
264
applicable to the actions of the states over a half-century ago.

264.
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the
Establishment Clause into the Due Process Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause into the Due Process Clause); De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (incorporating the Freedom to Assemble Clause
into the Due Process Clause); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (incorporating
the Free Press Clause into the Due Process Clause); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925) (incorporating the Free Speech Clause into the Due Process Clause).
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2. Density of the Authoritative Texts and Corresponding "Gaps" for
Judicial Conversation
Penned more recently, the European constitutional texts "embed
a denser political compact at the outset. '265 They are longer and more
specific than the one sentence of brief, negative injunctions that
comprises the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The
relevant provisions of these European constitutions are several
paragraphs. They prohibit a state religion; specify that cooperative
relationships with the state are possible for at least some religions in
Spain, and require equality in Russia; moreover, they include
freedom both individual and with others, extending to ideology or no
belief, and specify permissible limitations on the freedoms granted.
The concrete instruction that public authorities "maintain
appropriate cooperation relations with the Catholic church and other
confessions" in the Spanish Constitution contrasts sharply with the
silence in the U.S. Constitution. The First Amendment says nothing
about what prohibitions on laws "respecting an establishment of
religion" or prohibiting the free exercise thereof might mean for
relations between governments and religions. Specificity and concrete
instruction reflect the assumption in both Russia and Spain that
comprehensive legislation should and would regulate religion. The
civil-law tradition in each country also presumes that legislation
imparts legitimacy and that it will be "sufficiently clear, coherent and
'266
complete to make it unnecessary for courts to create precedent.
In contrast, the absolute, negative tone of the U.S. text reflects
the original assumption that the national government should not
legislate on matters regarding religion. Even after application to state
governments, the two religion clauses seemed to imply that
legislation regulating religion was suspect, especially if not
religiously neutral. 267 The presumption against religious regulation
was reinforced by an administrative law system that assumes
activities not regulated to be legitimate. In addition, the common-law
tradition, in contrast to the civil law tradition, assumes judicial
interpretation will clarify and complete legislation.
Accordingly, the constitutional texts that outline the terms of the
conversation in Russia and Spain leave less room for judicial

265.
Scheppele, supra note 149, at 236.
266.
Comella, supra note 140, at 466.
267.
Until the 1940s, the religion clauses did not operate against state but only
against federal regulation. The presumption is evident in the strict scrutiny applied to
laws targeting religion, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990), and in the
absence of sections of the federal or state codes dealing with religion. Religion is
incidentally regulated by comprehensive national legislation that addresses other
subjects, such as taxation. See e.g., I.R.C. § 501 (providing exemption from federal
corporate taxes to charitable organizations including explicitly religions and apostolic
associations and corporations).
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conversation. They give that conversation a more detailed structure,
reducing and refining its topics. And the legislatures have a greater
voice in the conversation and greater opportunity to define its topics
because the conversation is in light of challenge to and interpretation
of comprehensive national legislation.
In the United States, by contrast, the constitutional silences are
greater, granting the courts greater leeway to structure the
conversation. In addition, the conversation about religious freedom
has largely been occasioned by local, discrete, and brief
administrative regulation that does not explicitly address religion as
such. 268 Therefore, room for judicial construction of constitutional
meaning in an ongoing conversation about religious freedom is
greater in the United States. Courts may accordingly speak in a voice
of constitutional magnitude more often, addressing more and broader
issues and formulating rules to guide lower courts.
The challenge to the re-registration requirements in Russia was
relatively narrow. Much more open is the question of whether in the
United States a local requirement that one obtain a permit from the
Mayor before distributing literature violates the First Amendment.
And in such a case, the U.S. Supreme Court would also decide what
standards should generally apply to a permit system. In other words,
the "gaps" that judges fill are less numerous and more narrow in the
religious regulatory schemes of Russia and Spain, as is the
traditional role of the judge. The "gaps" are larger in the United
States, and so is the traditional role of the judge.
3. Opportunities for Courtroom Conversations and Conversations
Among Courts
Different court systems and differing structures for judicial
review affect opportunities for religious minorities to engage in
courtroom conversation and for courts to converse among themselves.

268.
See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (considering a local
ordinance restricting use of public park); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953)
(considering a local ordinance restricting use of public park); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) (involving a municipal penal ordinance on the use of sound amplification
without police chief approval); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (involving challenges to local school board requirements to salute the flag); Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (challenging a local parade licensing
ordinance); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (involving challenges
to local school board requirements to salute the flag). There were also numerous cases
involving challenges to municipal licensing ordinances that required written permits
before handbills could be distributed. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943);
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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Centralized constitutional judicial review in Russia and Spain
restricts opportunities for conversation more than in the United
States. The Constitutional Court is the only court in the Russian and
Spanish court systems that can consider whether legislation complies
with substantive constitutional requirements. Ordinary courts
influence the topics presented to the constitutional court by their
decisions whether to refer a question of statutory invalidity, to
interpret a statute to be constitutional, or both. But opportunity for a
full and public hearing and a ruling on constitutional questions is in a
single court.
Decentralized judicial review in the United States means that
courtroom conversations on the constitutional validity of religious
regulation can occur in trial and appellate courts as well as in the
U.S. Supreme Court. Moreover, not only federal courts but also all
levels of courts in the state systems can decide such questions.
Opportunities for constitutional conversation in the courtroom are
therefore far more numerous in the United States.
The greater number of courtroom conversations also increases
the conversation among courts in the United States. During and
preceding the time of the most intense Witness litigation in the U.S.
Supreme Court, other state and federal courts were also hearing
Witness claims under the First Amendment. Particularly when an
issue was not yet decided by the Supreme Court, the courts were
reading and citing each other's opinions. And when the Supreme
Court ultimately ruled, it had the advantage of prior consideration of
the issue by multiple courts.
This type of constitutional conversation within the national court
system does not appear to occur in Russia or Spain. Other instances
of conversation involving other texts and other participants may
however. Conversation among
enlarge
these conversations,
constitutional courts of various nations appears to be increasing, as
these courts read and cite the opinions of other constitutional
courts. 26 9 In Russia, this larger dimension to the conversation is
illustrated in the Witnesses' appeal of the 2004 Moscow court decision
under other aspects of the 1997 law to the European Court of Human
Rights, challenging it on the basis of the European Convention. Even
if it cannot invalidate national legislation, when this Court speaks on
an issue decided by a Russian court, it has a powerful voice that could
alter the conversation not only in Russia, but throughout Europe and
the world.

269.
See Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and
Transnational Judicial Discourse, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 91 (2004) (arguing that
constitutional courts around the world are confronting similar legal questions on issues
in regard to freedom of expression and social-welfare-related rights).
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Use of common-law reasoning by the U.S. Supreme Court also
creates a conversation. This conversation is among the present and
past Justices through the use of case precedent. The constitutional
courts of Russia and Spain also refer to past opinions and create a
"case law." The 1999 Russian Constitutional Court decision appears
to have modified the text under consideration in a manner that has
structured the analysis of future cases.
Discussion of precedent, however, is not as binding a constraint
on the conversations as it is in the United States. The horizontal
aspect of stare decisis requires the U.S. Supreme Court to abide by its
own prior decisions or give reasons to depart from them. The topic of
precedent is a compulsory one in the United States.
4. Altering the Subject Matter of the Conversation
As the Jehovah's Witnesses cases in the United States illustrate,
religious minorities can alter the meaning of enacted law by having a
voice in constitutional conversations. A particular instance of
courtroom conversation becomes a term of subsequent conversations
construing the same or a closely related constitutional text. Gradual
development of constitutional law through this ongoing conversation
alters the meaning of the text. While technically judicial precedents
are not on the same level as the enacted Constitution, by structuring
subsequent conversations they modify its meaning and in effect
operate similarly to the language of the text as the conversation
continues.
The U.S. constitutional conversation has greater capacity to
change the meaning of its foundational text than do the Russian and
Spanish conversations. Yet as these European conversations continue
and include conversations among constitutional and international
human rights courts, their ability to alter the meaning of their
foundational texts should grow as well.
C. The Russian and Spanish ConversationsAppear Less Complex
Than in the United States, and More Predictable
The differences summarized above make the conversation in the
United States more complex than those in Russia and Spain. More
occasions to converse, greater constitutional silence to fill, more and
weightier precedents to discuss, and more participants to include
make the United States conversation complex. This could well impede
access and make essential the use of lawyers able to discern and
synthesize the emerging meaning in the varied strands of the
conversation. Complexity should also delay formulation of standards
to apply and render them less certain at any particular stage in the
conversation. Law that is uncertain and difficult to understand is not
predictably applied. Those who are regulated, in this case new
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religious movements and minority religions, have less notice and
opportunity to conform their behavior to the law.
For all the reasons above, the methods in Russia and Spain seem
more fair and efficient. On the other hand, these traditional civil-law
values may not be as apparent in constitutional adjudication today.
The creation of constitutional courts adds uncertainty, as judicial
decision-making is inherently more uncertain than enacted law. The
presence of a supranational court and text, in the European Court of
Justice and the European Convention on Human Rights, is not
directly relevant to decision-making in the constitutional courts. But
to the extent that ordinary courts apply the Convention and read the
European Court's case law, they widen the human rights
conversation in the nation generally, which must have an indirect
influence on the conversation.2 70 In addition, if ordinary courts can
expand judicial review through statutory interpretation and referrals,
a greater number of courts participate in the conversation than is at
first apparent.
The treatment of the Jehovah's Witnesses by the Russian legal
system is an example. The effect of the Russian 1997 law was
uncertain. Religious groups had standing under the Constitution and
the legislation to raise claims, and a constitutional court in which to
challenge the legislative provisions and their application by the
authorities. In addition, Russia's participation in the European
Convention on Human Rights meant the 1997 re-registration
requirements were in tension with its non-discrimination provisions
and subject to challenge on that basis as well. Pending resolution of
the court challenge, the Witnesses suffered persecution by local
authorities and still are. The Court did not make a categorical ruling:
it construed only certain provisions of the law and by interpretation
seems to have avoided the underlying question of its validity.
Consequently, a series of decisions, and quite possibly decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights, will be necessary to test the law
before its effect on the Witnesses is made clear and certain.
D. The U.S. ConversationMay Be More Responsive to Minority
Religions
The flipside of complexity and uncertainty is greater
responsiveness to new circumstances and new litigants. While the
earlier experience of the Jehovah's Witnesses does not demonstrate
necessarily that the same is true today, the structure of the U.S.

270.
Indeed, Comella argues that the European Convention creates a force that
undermines centralized judicial review, because ordinary courts that cannot invalidate
legislation under the national constitution of Spain can do so under the European
Convention, and the constitutional court has stated it does not apply the Convention.
See Comella, supra note 140, at 463.
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conversation makes it potentially more responsive to minority
religions. This is due to the greater number of courtroom
conversations, greater ability to alter legal meaning, and the absence
of a history of a state-sponsored church.
New religious movements appear to have less of a voice in the
conversations in Spain and Russia than in the United States. The
authoritative texts for these European conversations do not preclude
distinctive or privileged voice for certain religious groups. The nondiscrimination provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights and the limitations on religious freedom it allows-those
"necessary in a democratic society"-imply religious pluralism and
treatment for culturally
tolerance, but they do not preclude different
2 71
traditional or dominant religious groups.
The Russian provisions do not appear to do so either.
Restrictions on the freedoms of belief, religion, and association that
are necessary to the legitimate grounds for restriction specified in
Articles 55 and 56 are allowed. Equality would limit such
restrictions, and religious associations are guaranteed equality under
article 14(2).272 The 1999 decision of the Russian Constitutional
Court presumes the constitutionality of legislative distinctions based
on the length of time a religion existed in Russia, however. While this
is an objective criterion, it is one that clearly discriminates against
new religious movements.
The Spanish constitutional provisions certainly do not exceed the
minimum European Convention standards on religious pluralism and
nondiscrimination. By confining limitations on religious freedom 2to
73
those "necessary to maintain public order as protected by law,"
Spain's Constitution appears similar to Russia's. Also, its denial of
"state character" to any religion ensures some equality of voice among
religions in Spain. Nevertheless, its provisions do not anticipate
religiously neutral legislation. This is evident in its distinctive
mandate of further conversation between the state and religious
groups: "[t]he public authorities shall take into account the religious
beliefs of Spanish society and shall consequently maintain
appropriate cooperation relations with the Catholic Church and other
confessions. '2 74 By giving discretion to public authorities to take into
account societal beliefs and by naming only the Catholic Church in
the mandate for cooperation relations, this provision lays a
foundation for regulation that discriminates against new and
minority religions.

271.
272.
273.
274.

See Durham, supra note 138, at 31.
RUss. CONST. pt. I, art. 14(2).
SPAIN CONST. pt. I, ch. 2, div. 1, § 16.
Id.
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Texts are written and conversations take place in a context, and
the histories of each country partially explain the privileging of
certain religious voices. Russia's Constitution was written in a break
from a period in which religious activity was repressed and the
appropriateness of pervasive state regulation of all private
associations was presumed. It followed a time in which a dominant
religion-the Russian Orthodox Church-enjoyed state sanction and
privilege. That denomination emerged from the socialist period as the
dominant voice of religion in the culture, a prominence later protected
by legislation.
The 1978 Spanish Constitution was similarly written after a
break from a prior period, one in which the voice of only one religion,
Roman Catholicism, was allowed and supported by the state.
Catholicism emerged from the Franco years as the dominant voice of
religion in Spanish culture, and the 1978 Constitution and the 1980
Organic Act give it privileged voice in the constitutional conversation.
Against these textual and historical backgrounds, legislatures in
each country created national regulatory systems implementing the
new legal status of religions, including the Witnesses. In each system
the dominant and traditional religion received superior status and
benefits to those of the Witnesses, other minority religions, and new
religious movements.
The Russian Parliament spoke through comprehensive national
religious regulation in 1990, recognizing that the Witnesses and other
new and minority religious groups with constitutional voice, legal
status. In 1997, however, it restricted their status and sphere of
activities. The Spanish Parliament also spoke comprehensively and
with national effect in the 1980 Organic Law of Religious Freedom,
giving the Witnesses the ability to register and be recognized as a
religious entity. The law also gave the Catholic Church superior
status and benefits, however, and denied benefits such as tax
exemptions to the Witnesses and other non-Catholic religions unable
to secure agreements with the State.
While in the United States a de facto establishment of Protestant
Christianity generally prevailed, there has been no formally statesanctioned and state-supported church for most of its history. 275 In
1947, as the Establishment Clause was applied to the states, its
absolute, negative tone and placement in the same phrase with the

275.
The colonies had varieties of "establishments." See Thomas J. Curry, THE
FIRST FREEDOMS ch. 5 (1986). Although the Establishment Clause was only made
applicable to the states in 1947, see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), its text
constrained conversation after enactment of the federal constitution: "[Clongress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. That it
prohibits secondary status arrangements has never been in doubt, although
majoritarian rule means majority religion can enjoy preferred status because of
inadvertent or unchallenged legislative action.
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Free Exercise Clause prompted the Supreme Court to hold that both
religion clauses required neutrality not only toward religion, but also
among religions. 276 Later judicial decisions enforced free exercise
doctrine on behalf of religious minorities substantially burdened by
otherwise legitimate government action. Since 1990,277 doctrine has
required a claimant to show that her religion was targeted before
government action harming her will be strictly reviewed, which has
278
lessened the Constitution's responsiveness to minority religions.
Nevertheless, it still requires at least formal equality among
2 79
religions.
The civil law's presumption that legislation is complete without
judicial interpretation reinforces the privileged voice of majority
religions evident in the text of the Spanish Constitution, the Russian
Law on Freedom of Conscious and Religious Association, and the
1999 decision of the Russian Constitutional Court. So may the more
abstract nature of constitutional review in many of the cases decided
by the Constitutional Courts in Russia and Spain. The actual
situation of minority claimants and the extent of the harm they suffer
may be less of a topic of conversation than if the constitutional courts
considered the concrete controversy. There seem to be fewer
opportunities to characterize facts and present a narrative that
competes with that of the state and includes one's case within the
language of the authoritative text, which the Witnesses used so well
in the United States.

Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The
276.
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another.").
In 1990, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), declared that the
277.
Free Exercise Clause did not mandate exemptions for religious conduct from regulation
pursuant to otherwise neutral and generally applicable laws. The 5-4 opinion
characterized those exemptions granted to Seventh Day Adventists in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), as incidental to individualized administrative hearings
used in unemployment compensation determinations, and those granted the Amish in
Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), as because of a "hybrid" conjunction of free
exercise and parental privacy rights. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. Therefore, minority
religious voice through the Free Exercise Clause is no longer as forceful, and those
religions with the greatest political power can impose burdens on religious minorities,
as long as the governmental action is not blatantly discriminatory on religious grounds.
Even when the Free Exercise Clause was given greater independent force by the
Supreme Court, some scholars have noted that even though others had claims and
were heard, only Protestant groups inoffensive to more established Christian
denominations obtained relief (Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Amish).
See Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the FirstAmendment: The History,
the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222 (2003); Mark Tushnet, "Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373,
380-81; Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV. 117,
1384-85.
Simkin, supra note 152.
278.
279.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Smith,
494 U.S. at 877.
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Fewer occasions for courtroom conversation and constitutional
conversation among courts seem to reduce the ability of conversations
in Russia and Spain to alter the meaning of their foundational texts.
And the Witnesses' experience in the United States indicates that
multiple fora increase the impact of a religious minority's voice. While
the Supreme Court is unreachable for most religious claimants, there
are many courts available and even an alternate system when one is
unresponsive.
Examination of the experiences of the Jehovah's Witnesses
to minority religions in the
responsiveness
demonstrates
constitutional courts of Russia and Spain. And the example of the
Witnesses in the United States is an older one, which does not reflect
the change in free exercise doctrine in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the
experience of the Witnesses in the United States demonstrates a
constitutional conversation that can be responsive to new religious
movements and religious minorities. Distinctive aspects of that
conversation also indicate that it could be more responsive than those
in Russia and Spain.

V. CONCLUSION

Textual brevity and ambiguity that entails greater judicial
"constitution making" can yield benefits for countries struggling with
integration of new religions or religious minorities. At the cost of
greater uncertainty in constitutional meaning, and on the condition of
an independent judiciary, it can give opportunity for public
conversation about religious freedom and equality as well as a means
for such religious groups to grow attached to the constitutional order.
The Jehovah's Witnesses in the United States, a relatively new
religious movement facing hostility, publicly discussed the meaning of
the brief constitutional words concerning freedom of speech and
religion in many and varied courts over thirty-five years. This
benefited the legal order because it resulted in gradual expansion of
constitutional protection for speech and expressive activities. It also
benefited the Witnesses, who were ultimately, if not quickly, able to
defend themselves from governmental action that appeared to
condone and at times facilitate private persecution. It appears also to
have contributed to social stability, by fostering the Witnesses'
attachment to the Constitution and to the legal system.
Constitutional voice, the ability to argue that their actions were
within the meaning of the text, seems to have affected the Witnesses'
self-understanding. Participation in the conversation appears to have
furthered their integration into the larger society, rather than
solidifying their antagonistic posture toward it.

